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Globalization, Migration and the U.S. Labor Market for Physicians:
The Impact of Immigration on Local Wages
Finnie B. Cook
ABSTRACT
The healthcare labor market has experienced some significant changes in the last 
half century, including the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, the 
emergence of managed care in the 1980s, and the worldwide mobility of labor 
encouraged by globalization.  Currently, more than 25% of physicians working in the 
U.S. are foreign-born. The existing body of literature related to the impact of immigration 
on local wages has to date found conflicting results.  The purpose of this research is to 
evaluate the impact of immigration of foreign physicians on local physician wages.  
This study employs physician survey data from the AMA Physician Masterfile for the 
years 1997 through 2007 combined with wage data published by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and data from other government sources.   Several econometric models are 
employed to analyze the wage impacts of immigration, including ordinary least squares, 
fixed effects, two-stage least squares and a first-difference approach to control for 
endogenous location choice.  
The results of this study provide evidence that in the short-run, the impacts of 
immigration of physicians on area wages is small but positive.  In the long run, however, 
wages adjust and the impact becomes negative and statistically significant, although the 
magnitude of the impact of a one percentage point increase in the share of immigrant 
vii
physicians in an area is less than 0.2%.  The negative wage effects of immigration tend to 
be larger for foreign-born physicians educated in the U.S. compared with foreign-born 
international medical graduates.
The study also finds evidence that the negative effects of immigration tend to be 
offset by outflows of the lowest paid native physicians.  Furthermore, physicians tend to 
locate in areas where wages are already higher, and foreign-born physicians are more 
likely than their native counterparts to work in larger cities as opposed to rural areas.  
The research has important policy implications in the presence of current debate 
over immigration law and healthcare reform and in an era of increasing mobility of labor 
due to globalization.    
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
The market for labor in the medical care industry has experienced some 
significant changes in the last half century.  The establishment of Medicare and Medicaid 
in 1965, followed by the emergence of managed care in the 1980s, has dramatically 
changed the way physicians operate their practices and receive payment.  Furthermore, 
globalization has encouraged worldwide mobility of labor and the U.S. labor market for 
medical professionals no longer consists only of native workers; on the contrary, data 
published in the 2009 Statistical Abstract of the United States indicate that as of 2006, 
more than 25% of physicians in the U.S. were educated at foreign medical schools.  In 
addition, many graduates of U.S. medical schools are foreign students who often stay in 
the U.S. after achieving their degree.  The following research analyzes immigrant 
doctors: who are they demographically, where do they come from, and where do they 
locate?  Furthermore, this paper investigates the impact of physician immigration on the 
average wages of doctors in the U.S.
2Chapter 2: Globalization and Immigration
2.1: Migration in the Contemporary Period
One important feature of modern globalization involves migration.  The world has 
seen recent growth in immigration to developed countries.  The number of working-age 
individuals born in one country and living in another country increased from 42 million 
in 1990 to 59 million in 2000, or 1.7 million per year, on average (Docquier 2005).  
According to Massey and Taylor (2004), “contemporary international migration unfolds 
in a context of the globalization of markets.”  Castles and Miller (1998) posit, “while 
movements of people across borders have shaped states and societies since time 
immemorial, what is distinctive in recent years is their global scope, their centrality to 
domestic and international politics and their enormous economic and social 
consequences.”  The United States is by far the world’s largest immigrant destination.  
Although the relative intensity of immigration into the U.S. was greater in the 19th
century than in the contemporary period of globalization, there has been a change in the 
kind of migrant in the contemporary period.  Changes in U.S. immigration law since 1952 
have resulted in an increase in immigration of high-skilled workers as well as persons 
from Asia and Latin America.
2.2: History of Immigration and Immigration Law in the U.S.
In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the first legislation 
emphasizing labor qualification as a preference for entry into the United States, became 
3law.  Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965 opened the doors to 
immigrants from non-European countries including Asians and Latin Americans.  The 
1990 Immigration Act was designed to increase the number of immigrants admitted on 
the basis of skill level, but also maintained the importance of family reunion and refugee 
acceptance (Gardner and Bouvier 1990, Castles and Miller 1998).  Current immigration 
law provides preferential treatment to family members of U.S. citizens, and otherwise 
allows for immigration of three types of immigrants: employment based immigrants with 
their spouses and children, refugees and asylum seekers, and diversity immigrants 
(immigrants from countries which have been underrepresented in recent immigration) 
(Massey 2004).
2.3: Changes in Immigration in the Contemporary Period
Prior to World War II, most U.S. immigrants were low-skilled workers employed 
in “menial jobs in the public services and dirty jobs in the manufacturing sector” (Held 
1999).  As a result of the changes in legislation since 1952, increasing numbers of 
migrants are employed in private and domestic service industries.  Furthermore, a steady 
movement of highly skilled, highly trained professionals (“elite migrants”) has been 
occurring (Held 1999).  This phenomenon has been referred to in the development 
economics literature as the “brain drain” from developing to developed countries.  In 
addition to the changes in legislation, Castles and Miller (1998) argue that an increase in 
the international mobility of highly qualified personnel, in both temporary and permanent 
flows, is also attributable to globalization.  The Immigration Act of 1990 further 
emphasized selection of high-skilled workers, employing a system of quotas favoring 
4candidates with academic degrees or specific professional skills (Docquier 2005). 
According to the 2005-07 American Community Surveys, 19.1% of foreign-born U.S. 
citizens had a bachelor’s degree, compared with 17.4% of native U.S. citizens (only 
12.9% of foreign-born non-U.S. citizens living in the United States had a bachelor’s 
degree).  Furthermore, 12.6% of foreign-born U.S. citizens and 9.3% of foreign-born 
non-U.S. citizens living in the U.S. had advanced degrees beyond the bachelor’s, 
compared with 9.7% of native U.S. citizens. The immigrants possessing bachelor’s 
degrees or higher overwhelmingly come from Asia.
The largest migration of Asians in recent history occurred after the passage of the 
1965 amendments to immigration law.  The number of migrants from Asia increased 
from 17,000 in 1965 to more than 250,000 on average annually in the 1980s, to over 
350,000 per year in the early 1990s.  In addition, the number of Asian students studying 
in the U.S. increased from 82,709 in 1965 to 453,787 in 1995.  This statistic is important, 
because it is not uncommon for students to come to America to study and eventually stay 
in the country; in the late 1960s, 90% of students from Taiwan and Korea who came to 
the U.S. for training never returned home.  Since 1980, more than half of all U.S. 
doctorates awarded in the field of engineering have gone to foreigners, predominantly 
Asian.  According to the 1990 Census, over 60% of immigrants over age 25 from Taiwan 
and India had college degrees, and over 45% of the immigrants from these countries hold 
management or professional positions (Castles 1998, Massey 2004).  
Waldinger and Gilbertson (1994) report that in the 1980s, “a substantial portion of 
the new immigrants is far more highly skilled than native whites of native parentage.”  
They found that Asian and Iranian immigrants, in particular, had substantially higher 
5levels of education, on average, than their native white counterparts.  However, of non-
European immigrants, only the Japanese had higher average per capita income than the 
native white population.  According to Madhavan (1985), “the occupational composition 
of Indian immigrants in the United States was much more professionally and technically 
oriented than the U.S. labor force as a whole.  Over 80 percent of the Indian immigrant 
labor force in 1981 was engaged in professional, technical, and management categories of 
employment… as against 27 percent for the nation as a whole.”
6Chapter 3: Literature Review
3.1: The Effect of Immigration on Native/Local Wages
Immigration law is currently a topic of national debate in the United States.  The 
U.S. Census Bureau estimates that from July 1, 2007 to July 1, 2008, 888,825 people 
immigrated legally to the United States. This represents 32% of the total change in 
population, after considering births and deaths of the native population.  Much of the 
current debate involves illegal immigration, and the impact that both legal and illegal 
immigration have on the wages and employment of native citizens.  
Although numerous studies have focused on the effect of immigration on wages 
and employment, particularly with regard to low-skilled workers, no consensus on the 
issue has yet been reached.  Basic economic theory posits that an increase in the supply 
of low-skilled (high-skilled) workers should result in a decrease in the wage of low-
skilled (high-skilled) workers, all else being equal.  If a shift in the supply of labor 
decreases wages and thus increases employment, the country experiences a gain in 
national income, or immigration surplus.  Borjas (1995) illustrates that the immigration 
surplus is proportional to the demand elasticity of factor price for labor.  The greater the 
impact of immigration on wages, the higher the gain to the nation as a whole.  Borjas 
reports that studies summarized in Hamermesh (1993) indicate that the demand elasticity 
of factor price is greater for skilled workers than unskilled workers; this would suggest 
that immigration of high-skilled workers would have a greater impact on wages of native 
high-skilled workers than immigration of low-skilled workers would have on wages of 
7native low-skilled workers.  Thus, the immigration surplus would be larger when 
immigrants are more skilled.  Furthermore, skilled labor is likely to have production 
complementarities with capital, which adds to the potential immigration surplus.  
However, these results rely on the result that immigration shifts the labor supply curve 
and decreases native wages.  This result has not been proven in the empirical literature; 
there is conflicting evidence in the literature as to whether immigration has any effect on 
native wages at all.  Some studies have found that immigration either lowers the wages of 
low-skilled workers or widens the income gap between the rich and poor, although the 
magnitudes of these effects are relatively small.  Furthermore, even if immigration does 
reduce wages and thus produces an immigration surplus, this surplus generally involves a 
transfer of wealth from labor to capital, which may not be in agreement with policy 
objectives.  The impact of immigration of physicians on wages and employment of their 
native counterparts is even less clear, as it is complicated by licensing requirements and 
payment mechanisms involving third party payors.
There are two generally accepted methods of testing the effects of immigration on 
wages and employment: area analyses and factor-proportions analyses.  
3.2: Area Analysis Approach
Area analyses exploit the fact that immigration is usually geographically 
concentrated, and contrast the level (or change) in immigration by area with the level (or 
change) in earnings of nonimmigrant workers (Borjas 1996).  They usually calculate a 
spatial correlation between wages in a particular metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and 
the ratio of immigrants to native population in that area.  These studies have found that, 
8in general, immigration has a minimal effect on native wages.  Butcher and Card (1991) 
employed the area analysis approach and analyzed changes in the distribution of wages in 
24 major cities during the 1980s, particularly focusing on the “lower tail” of the wage 
distribution.  They found that the labor market consequences of an immigration influx 
tended to be relatively small, in part because immigrant inflows were often offset by 
outflow migration of natives.  They also found that, although there was no significant 
decline in wages at the lower end of the earnings distribution, higher levels of 
immigration were associated with more rapid increases in the 90th percentile of wages, 
contributing to a widening gap between the rich and the poor.  
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1996) use data from the 1980 and 1990 Census to 
estimate the cross-sectional effect of immigration, measured as the ratio of immigrants to 
natives in the relevant area, on the log of weekly earnings of natives in that area.  Their 
model takes a differences-in-differences approach to control for changes in local labor 
market conditions from 1980 to 1990 as well as educational achievement of natives and 
immigrants, which allows them to measure the impact of immigration on earnings after 
controlling for other factors that affect wages.  They find that, for a small geographical 
area, such as an MSA, the effect of immigration on wages is nearly zero, but positive.  
However, widening the geographic focus to the state or region level turns the effect of 
immigration on wages negative, although the magnitudes of the coefficients are still 
relatively small. 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) use data from the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) and the Current Population Surveys (CPS) to study the relationship 
between immigration and native wages by broad occupational group, over the time period 
9from 1994 to 2000.  Their method regresses the average earnings of natives in a particular 
occupation group (professional, service-related, or manual labor) on the fraction of 
workers in that group who are immigrants and other control variables.  The ordinary least 
squares regression results indicate that higher immigrant shares are associated with 
positive wage effects on more skilled natives and negative effects on less skilled natives.  
Because immigration into an area may not be independent of local wages, they also
control for endogeneity by using immigrants who are admitted to the U.S. in a given year 
as the spouse of a U.S. citizen as an instrumental variable.  The results of the two-stage
least squares regression indicate essentially no effect of immigration on wages of 
professionals, a negative but insignificant effect on wages of service workers, and a 
statistically significant negative effect on wages of manual laborers.  In addition, they 
find that all of the adverse wage impacts come from immigrants who are not new arrivals, 
presumably as it takes some time for immigrants to assimilate into the labor force. 
Area analyses have been criticized because, by taking a “snapshot in time” 
approach to studying the effect of immigration on wages in a particular metropolitan area, 
the approach implicitly assumes that local labor markets are closed.  This assumption 
obviously does not concur with reality.  If, in fact, native workers respond to an influx in 
immigration by migrating to other U.S. cities, this would reduce the impact of 
immigration in a particular MSA.  This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of 
Butcher and Card (1991).  In addition, Frey (1994) found that during the 1980s, as 
foreigners from Mexico, China, and other countries immigrated to the cities of Los 
Angeles and New York, large numbers of native whites moved away.  Specifically, 
competition for low-skilled jobs and the growing population encouraged low and middle 
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income native whites to migrate elsewhere, but generally did not affect migration of high 
income natives.  Furthermore, if immigrants intentionally choose to locate in areas where 
wages are high, then choice of location is endogenous and the correlation between 
immigration and wages in that particular area would be artificially positive.    
Card (2001) addresses the two main criticisms of area analyses in a study of the 
effect of immigration on employment and wages by broad occupational group.  His 
analysis uses data from the late 1980s and focuses mainly on the impact of immigration 
on less-skilled occupational groups.  In contrast to earlier studies that used the fraction of 
immigrants in a city as a measure of immigrant competition, Card breaks the immigrant 
share down by occupational grouping.  His analysis of the data indicates that, at least in 
the short term, if anything, immigration encourages native migration to rather than away 
from the immigrant-heavy city.   To control for the possibility that unobserved city and 
occupation specific factors (productivity shocks) attract immigrants and are therefore 
correlated with both wages and immigration flows, Card constructs an instrumental 
variable based on the fact that newly arriving immigrants tend to move to cities where 
earlier immigrants from their country are already established.  In particular, he estimates 
an “exogenous supply-push component”, the actual inflow of immigrants from a given 
source country moving to a given city based on total inflows from the country and the 
fraction of earlier immigrants from that country who live in the city, multiplied by the 
fraction of immigrants from that country who fall into a particular occupation group.  
After controlling for the two criticisms of area analysis studies, Card’s empirical analysis 
finds a systematically negative effect of immigration on both employment and wages of 
native workers.
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3.3: Factor Proportions Analysis
Factor-proportions analyses take a general equilibrium perspective, treating 
immigrants as a source of an increased national supply of workers of the relevant skill, 
and applying an elasticity of substitution to estimate the effects of changes in the labor 
supply on native wages (Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1996).  
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992) employ a factor proportions approach to 
determine the impact of trade and immigration on wages and employment of native 
workers, particularly those with a high school diploma or less, using data from the 1970s 
and 1980s.  They identify that in the 1980s, the wages and employment rate of less-
skilled workers fell in relation to those of more skilled workers, and suggest that this 
change could be caused both by changes in the trade deficit as well as immigration.  
Their analysis concludes that the immigration flow did not significantly alter the nation’s 
relative supplies of high school and college graduates during the 1980s and therefore is 
unlikely to have had much effect on relative wages of these groups of workers.  However, 
both trade and immigration greatly expanded the supply of high school dropouts relative 
to other workers and had a negative impact on the wages of these workers during this 
time period.  The authors confirmed in their 1996 study (Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1996) 
that immigration contributed moderately to a rise in wage inequality in the 1980s. 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) introduce a production function in which capital 
accumulates endogenously and make a critical assumption that U.S. and foreign-born 
workers with similar levels of education and experience are imperfect substitutes for one 
another.  The imperfect substitutability occurs because of differences in training, job 
choice, or other unobservable differences between U.S. and foreign-born workers.  The 
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authors’ analysis estimates the total effect of immigration on U.S. aggregate wages, both 
through “own” and “cross” elasticities.  They use country-level data from the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Sample for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and divide the groups by 
education and experience level.  Their analysis yields an elasticity of substitution of 
foreign graduates to natives of about 4 for college graduates, 7 for high school dropouts
and 10 for high school graduates and college dropouts.  This finding suggests that, of all 
education groups, it is hardest to substitute foreign-born college graduates for native 
college graduates.  Using these elasticity of substitution estimates, the authors estimate 
the impact of immigration on native wages to be large and positive in the aggregate: an 
8% increase in foreign-born workers increases the average U.S. wage by 2.2%.  The top 
three education groups gain by about 2.4% each, while the high school dropouts lose; 
their wages decrease by about 2.4%.  Furthermore, the authors simulate several 
counterfactual immigration policy situations, in which different types of workers were 
precluded from immigrating.  They find that the most harmful scenario for the U.S., in 
terms of aggregate native wages, would be to replace immigration of high school 
dropouts with immigration of college graduates: the effect of immigration on aggregate 
wages would then drop to approximately zero.
Borjas, Freeman & Katz (1996) compare the area analysis and factor proportions 
approaches, and find that the estimated effect of immigration on native workers is very 
sensitive to the empirical experiment employed.  They find very unstable results for both 
methods of analysis, suggesting that results should be interpreted cautiously.  Overall, 
they conclude that immigration has played a role in reducing the pay of high school 
dropouts, while having a smaller negative effect on earnings of high school graduates. 
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3.4:  Other Research
Johnson (1980) and Topel (1994) studied the effect of immigration on wages of 
low-skilled workers and found that, indeed, immigration has a negative effect on native 
wages.  Johnson’s analysis is concerned mainly with illegal immigration of low-skilled 
workers and concludes that, although immigration decreases native wages of low-skilled 
workers, it has little effect on employment, and actually increases the wages of high-
skilled workers and holders of capital.  Thus, immigration tends to widen the income gap 
between the rich and the poor.  Topel’s analysis finds that, in particular, increased 
immigration of less-skilled Hispanic and Asian workers in the western United States has 
had a negative impact on the wages of natives, thus causing a greater increase in income 
inequality than anywhere else in the country.  
Less research has been done to determine the effect of immigration of high-skilled
workers on the wages of high-skilled native workers in the United States.  Borjas (2003) 
analyzed the effect of immigration on native wages and employment by education and 
years of experience, using data from the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 Census as well as 
the 1999, 2000, and 2001 Current Population Surveys.  His model assumes that similarly 
educated workers with different levels of experience participate in a national labor market 
and are not perfect substitutes for each other.  His analysis finds a clear negative impact 
of immigration on native wages; an influx of immigration was found to decrease the 
wages of native high school dropouts by 8.9%, those of high school graduates decreased 
2.6%, and those of college graduates decrease by 4.9%.  Overall, a 10% increase in the 
supply of workers through immigration decreases wages by 3% to 4%.  
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Borjas (2005) and Borjas (2006) evaluate the impact of immigration of foreign 
students on the earnings of doctorates.  Using data from the National Science 
Foundation’s Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED) and Survey of Doctoral Recipients 
(SDR), Borjas employs a two stage least squares regression analysis and finds, in 
agreement with Borjas (2003), that a 10% increase in the supply of doctorates due to 
immigration results in a 3% to 4% decrease in wages of doctorates in the same field.
Camarota (2007) found a negative impact of immigration on the employment 
opportunities for native-born workers.  He notes that most of the increase in immigration 
he studied came not from the very bottom of the labor pool; about 50% of the growth in 
immigrant employment from 2000 to 2004 came from immigrants with at least a high 
school education.  
Chiswick (2005) addresses the increased demand in the late 20th and early 21st
centuries for high-skilled technology workers in OECD countries, largely due to the 
Computer Revolution, globalization, and immigration of low-skilled workers.  The 
United States Immigration Act of 1990 shifted the focus from family reunification (which 
largely involved low-skilled workers) to an increased role of high-skilled worker 
immigration.  Chiswick posits that while tending to lower the average wage of high-
skilled workers, high-skilled worker immigration actually increases the average wage of 
the low-skilled workers who complement the productivity of said high-skilled 
immigrants.  This, in turn, reduces poverty and income inequality, and alleviates the 
burden of the government to provide welfare programs for the poor.  He therefore argues 
that overall, immigration of high-skilled workers to developed countries has a positive 
effect on the economy.  In contrast, he opines that immigration of low-skilled workers 
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tends to lower the average wage of low-skilled workers and worsens the income gap, 
increases poverty and results in an increased need for government spending.  Low-skilled 
workers tend to draw more government benefits than they pay for in taxes, which can 
contribute to already fiscally-strained social welfare programs in developed nations, 
including the United States.
3.5: Immigration of Physicians
Weiss (2000) made use of what was essentially a natural experiment that took 
place in Israel: the sudden and large influx of highly-skilled migrants from the former 
U.S.S.R.  Specifically, 12,200 medical doctors migrated from the former U.S.S.R. to 
Israel between 1989 and 1993, compared with 15,600 doctors living in Israel in 1989.  
Weiss’ analysis finds that highly-skilled immigrants initially accepted lower wages and 
worked in lower-skilled occupations, slowly climbing the “occupational ladder” and 
finding jobs that suited their occupation, skill-level, and earning capacity.  The study 
concludes that even a significantly large influx of high-skilled immigrants had negligible 
effects on native wages and employment.  
Svorny (1991) uses a factor-proportions type analysis to estimate the effects of 
liberalization of restrictions on physician migration in a time of increased demand in the 
U.S.   Specifically, she uses aggregate data for the time period 1966-71, just after the 
passing of the Immigration Act of 1965 and shortly after the creation of Medicare and 
Medicaid.  Svorny argues that over such a short time period, the native supply of 
physicians should be relatively inelastic, even in the face of an unexpected increase in 
demand.  Thus, she argues that any change in consumer welfare during the time period is 
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attributed solely to the change in immigration law.  Although the inelasticity of supply 
assumption is likely to hold in the short run, it seems that her results apply only in the 
face of an increase in demand.  In other words, although she is able to identify the effect 
of immigration under specific conditions, the results may not apply to a labor market in 
the absence of such a demand shock.  In addition, the study makes assumptions about the 
price elasticity of demand for physician services and attempts to calculate the number of 
physicians and residents that would have been present in the U.S. in a given year under 
the counterfactual assumption that the law had not changed.  The study finds that “the 
dollar value of the benefits to consumers from the 1965 liberalization of immigration 
restrictions reached 2.9 billion dollars by 1971” and that “if the additional migration had 
not been permitted and if prices had been free to adjust to equate supply and demand, 
physician earnings would have been at least 11% higher in 1971.”  Svorny uses physician 
earnings as a proxy for price.  Although this may have been an effective measure in the 
1960s, today it is not necessarily the case that physician earnings and prices for medical 
care are so highly correlated.  A reduction in the price charged for medical care may or 
may not translate into a change in the price of care that patients actually pay for (in the 
form of insurance premiums, co-pays, or actually paying directly for the service) and 
similarly may or may not affect physician earnings. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the existing literature.
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Table 1
Summary of Existing Empirical Literature: Labor Market Effects of Immigration
Author (Year) Results of Analysis
Butcher & Card 
(1991)
No significant effect on wages of low-skilled workers, wages 
of high-skilled workers grew more rapidly, increased income 
gap. (1980s data)
Svorny (1991) Consumer gains and decrease in physician wages after the 
Immigration Act of 1965. (1966-1971 data)
Borjas, Freeman and 
Katz (1992)
Negative impact on wages and employment of high school 
dropouts. (1980s data)
Topel (1994) Increased income gap in the West. (1972-1990)
Borjas, Freeman & 
Katz (1996)
Small positive effect of immigration on wages in an MSA, 
small negative effect in broader geographic area.
 Rise in wage inequality.
(1970s-1980s data)
Weiss (2000) Negligible effects of high skilled immigration on wages and 
employment of high skilled workers. (Israel, 1989)
Card (2001) Significant negative impact on wages and employment.
(late 1980s)
Borjas (2003) Negative impact on wages for all education groups. 
(1960-2001 data)
Ottaviano & Peri 
(2005)
Large positive aggregate effect on wages.  High school 
dropouts lose, more highly educated workers gain. 
(1970-2000 data)
Borjas (2005), Borjas 
(2006)
Negative impact of foreign doctoral student program on native 
wages. (1968-2000 data)
Orrenius & Zavodny 
(2007)
No effect on wages of professionals, insignificant effect on 
service workers, negative effect on manual laborers. 
(1994-2000 data)
Camarota (2007) Negative impact on employment for all education groups
It is evident that, although the literature tends to support a negative impact of 
immigration on wages of low-skilled workers, even the most recent studies conflict as to 
the effect on wages of high-skilled workers.  Most notably, Ottaviano and Peri (2005) 
find that immigration increases wages of native high-skilled workers, while Borjas 
(2003, 2005, 2006) find just the opposite: that immigration decreases the wages of native 
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high-skilled workers.  In addition, research focused on specific occupations is almost 
nonexistent.  The study by Svorny (1991) is an interesting one with respect to physicians; 
however, changes in the medical care industry since 1965 certainly merit further, more 
current research in this area.    
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Chapter 4: Justification for Study
4.1: Academic Value
As discussed in the previous chapter, earlier studies of the impact of immigration 
on local wages find conflicting results.  This research makes use of an excellent data 
source, the AMA Physician Masterfile, which has not previously been employed in 
studies of this type.  For the first time, the effect of immigration on a particular 
occupation will be studied using detailed data that isolates the effects being studied from 
the “noise” which is present in other studies that use aggregate data to analyze broader 
occupational groups or skill categories.  According to Card (2001), because of the large 
differences in skill levels among immigrants in different areas, studying “the overall 
fraction of immigrants in a city is simply too crude an index of immigrant competition for 
any particular subgroup of natives.”  Card argues for studying the impacts of immigration 
at the occupational level.  The particular choice of occupation in this study, the physician, 
extends the application of the data and results beyond simply the academic question of 
whether immigration decreases native wages to policy issues pertaining to healthcare and 
immigration policy in the U.S. Furthermore, this study has applications in many fields of 
economics; including, but not limited to health, international, development, and labor 
economics.  
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4.2: Immigration and Healthcare Policy
Since the early 1900s, there has been an ongoing debate as to whether the U.S. 
has too many or too few physicians, and whether the government should be involved in 
controlling the physician supply.  The Flexner report published in 1910 concluded that 
there was an oversupply of largely under trained medical professionals in the U.S.  The 
relative supply of physicians subsequently fell due to the closing of a number of medical 
schools of lesser quality.  The general consensus that the U.S. had an oversupply of 
physicians continued until the publication of the Bane report in 1959, which predicted a 
shortage of physicians in the U.S. by 1975.  This was followed by government subsidies 
encouraging the expansion of the number of medical schools as well as the number of 
students admitted.  In 1981, the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory 
Committee published a report indicating that by 1990, the U.S. would again face a 
surplus of physicians and recommended that the number of students admitted to U.S. 
medical schools as well as the number of foreign physicians allowed to immigrate be 
restricted.  Subsequent reports by the Council on Graduate Medical Education (COGME) 
in the early 1990s, the Bureau of Health Professions, and Tarlov (1986) and Weiner 
(1994) confirmed that a surplus of physicians would occur by the year 2000.  Thus, 
policymakers in the 1980s and 90s generally took steps to limit first, the number of 
students admitted to U.S. medical schools and, later, the number of foreign physicians 
admitted to the country as immigrants.  However, just as it seemed a consensus had been 
reached that the U.S. was, in fact, facing a surplus of physicians, the research of Cooper 
(1998) projected just the opposite: that by 2010 the U.S. would be facing a shortage of 
physicians, especially specialists (Blumenthal 2004).  Reports in the recent medical 
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literature have brought to light this pending physician shortage (Moore 2003, Cross 2007, 
Arvantes 2007).  Based on a recent study by the COGME, the American Medical 
Association adopted a resolution at their 2008 Annual House of Delegates Meeting 
recognizing that “there is currently a shortage of physicians” (Resolution 309).  The 
shortage of physicians is generally thought to be even larger in rural and inner city areas.  
Physician supply becomes an even more relevant topic due to the current political climate 
with regard to healthcare reform.  According to an April 2009 article in the New York 
Times, “Obama administration officials, alarmed at doctor shortages, are looking for 
ways to increase the supply of physicians to meet the needs of an aging population and 
millions of uninsured people who would gain coverage under legislation championed by 
the president” (Pear 2009).
Whether the U.S. is truly facing a “shortage” of physicians in the economic sense 
of the word and, if so, whether it is appropriate for the AMA and/or the government to 
attempt to control the supply are matters for debate.  However, given that for the last 
century these organizations have attempted to do just that, the supply of physicians can 
be affected through a change in the number of students admitted to U.S. medical schools 
and/or a change in immigration policy with respect to international medical graduates.  
Current immigration policy provides preferential treatment to more highly educated 
immigrants, and also favors immigrant physicians willing to work in underserved areas.  
Although many studies have attempted to estimate physician demand and supply to 
determine whether a shortage or surplus exists, no work has been done to evaluate how 
changes in the supply due to immigration would affect the wages and employment of the 
local labor market.  Given that there is likely to be a growing demand for medical care in 
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the future due to the aging population of baby boomers as well as potentially newly 
insured patients, a study of the effect of an increase in the supply of foreign physicians is 
certainly merited.
Thus, the study has important policy implications in the presence of current 
debate over immigration law and healthcare reform and in an era of increasing mobility 
of labor due to globalization.  From the point of view of the United States, whether 
foreign physicians are filling positions in areas that have a physician shortage or whether 
they compete directly with domestic doctors for jobs in already populated areas should be 
considered when determining immigration policy.  Current proposals for future 
immigration law include implementing a point system, under which potential immigrants 
would receive additional points based on higher levels of education.  Thus, the proposed 
legislation would make it easier, all else equal, for highly educated foreigners to 
immigrate to the United States.  Borjas (1995) concludes that the benefits of immigration 
can be increased by pursuing policies that attract high-skilled workers.  Chiswick (2005) 
also seems to imply that policies favoring high-skilled immigrants are preferable.  
However, Ottaviano and Peri (2005) find just the opposite; that, in fact, any net welfare 
gains from immigration could be eliminated by establishing policies that resulted in an 
increase in high-skilled immigration at the expense of low-skilled immigration.  Thus, 
before drawing such a conclusion the effect of such immigration on their native 
counterparts should be better understood.  
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Chapter 5: Immigrant Physicians: Visa Requirements
This study analyzes immigration of both physicians educated in the U.S. as well 
as in a foreign country.  Graduates of foreign medical schools are typically referred to in 
the literature as IMGs (international medical graduates).  In order to practice medicine in 
the U.S., IMGs are required to pass federal and state licensing examinations pertaining 
both to medical knowledge and English language before they are eligible to apply for a 
visa.  
Graduates of international medical schools may enter the United States under one 
of several visa programs: the temporary work visa, H-1B, is the most common.  This visa 
is restricted to highly-skilled individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree who are 
obtaining work in a high-skilled occupation.  This visa requires an employer, such as a 
hospital, to sponsor the visa of the immigrating physician.  Unless the physician obtains 
another type of visa later or obtains citizenship through marriage at some point (which is 
likely), the H-1B visa is for a term of three to six years.  
Some IMGs may enter the U.S. under the O visa program.  This visa is restricted 
to persons with extraordinary abilities in their field.  Thus, the physician must be 
considered an expert in their field or have achieved a significant amount of exemplary 
research experience in order to qualify for such a visa.  This visa has less stringent 
restrictions with regard to employer sponsorship.  In addition, although the O visa is 
typically approved for three years, it may be extended indefinitely and thus there is no 
limit set on the amount of a time a physician with an O visa can remain in the U.S.
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Finally, most immigrants who move to the U.S. to study at a U.S. medical school 
do so under the J-1 training visa.  This visa program was enacted to encourage exchange 
of knowledge between the U.S. and other countries.  The J-1 visa normally requires 
immigrants to return to their home country for a minimum of two years after completing 
their residency in the U.S. before returning under another visa.  However, the U.S. 
government makes an exception to this requirement in three cases: persecution, hardship, 
and government recommendation.  A persecution waiver may be obtained if the 
physician is seeking asylum in the U.S. from persecution in their home country.  A 
hardship waiver may be available if, due to immediate family living in the U.S., the 
physician and/or his family would suffer “exceptional hardship” if the physician were
forced to return to his or her home country for two years.  Finally, and most common, if 
the physician agrees to provide primary care services in federally-designated health 
professional shortage areas (HPSAs or MUAs) for a minimum of three years, a waiver of 
the two year return-home requirement may be granted.  Foreign physicians who graduate 
from U.S. medical schools are normally subject to the same licensing examinations as 
their native-born counterparts.  
All immigrant physicians may eventually be able to apply for permanent 
residence in the United States under several alternative circumstances.  Asylum-seekers, 
physicians who marry a U.S. citizen, and those who start substantial successful 
businesses in the U.S that employ at least ten U.S. workers are eligible to apply for 
permanent residency.  Physicians in the U.S. on an O visa, as previously stated, may 
continuously extend their visas.  Finally, almost any foreign physician who agrees to 
work in primary fields in HPSAs (Health Professional Shortage Areas) or MUAs
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(Medically Underserved Areas) for a minimum of five years may apply for permanent 
residency.  Thus, there are many circumstances in which an immigrant physician who 
moves to the U.S. for education purposes may end up living and practicing in the U.S. for 
many years (Ester 2004, Klasko 1999, Mautino 2002).  
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Chapter 6: Theoretical Foundations
6.1: Physician Labor Demand and Supply
The basic theoretical model underlying this study is a simple model of labor 
demand and supply.  In economics, the study of the demand for healthcare has been 
framed in terms of the demand for “health” itself.  An individual’s demand for health 
influences their demand for health services, which are produced, like other goods, using 
both labor and capital.  The production function for health services can therefore be 
written: Q = f(L,K).
The demand for each input will depend, in part, on the price of the final good (or 
service, as the case may be).  As the price of the health service increases, so does the 
marginal revenue product of labor and, therefore, so should the wage rate.  The wage rate 
also depends on productivity; if new technology allows a physician to become more 
productive, the marginal revenue product increases and so should the physician’s wage 
rate.  
The demand for each input also depends on the degree of substitutability between 
the factors as well as their relative prices (which, in the case of labor, is the wage rate).  
The degree of substitution between capital and labor will depend on the particular service 
desired.  For example, new advances in technology have resulted in machines which can 
dispense pills just as a pharmacist could.  In this case, hospitals may somewhat easily 
substitute between labor and capital.  However, some surgeries may require specific skills 
of a surgeon that no machine is capable of performing; in this case, the degree of 
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substitutability is very small.  In the last few decades, and particularly with the increasing 
pressure from managed care companies to control costs, firms in the healthcare industry 
have not only attempted to substitute capital and labor but also to substitute less-skilled, 
cheaper labor for high-priced physicians.  Many services that formerly were performed 
by physicians are now performed by nurse practitioners or physician assistants.  
Furthermore, advances in technology now require more technicians to operate machinery 
and fewer specialized physicians to actually perform complex tests.  
The supply curve of labor is upward sloping, such that more doctors will be 
willing to work for a higher wage rate.  Higher wages may encourage physicians to work 
more hours and/or see more patients.  In addition, physicians working in other areas, both 
in the U.S. and abroad, are encouraged to move to areas where wages are higher.  The 
demand curve of labor is downward sloping, such that the lower the price of labor, the 
greater is the amount of labor demanded.  The equilibrium market wage rate is 
determined where the supply and demand curves intersect.  
The equilibrium physician wage will change in response to a shift in either the 
demand or supply curve.  The supply curve can be shifted outward by an increase in the 
number of physicians in an area, either due to an influx of new medical school graduates 
or physicians moving in from other areas, whether from within the U.S. or due to 
immigration.  In the absence of any demand shocks, basic economic theory posits that, in 
the presence of such a supply shift, the wage of physicians will decrease in the short run.  
In the long run, native physicians may respond by moving out of the area, or fewer 
students will apply to medical school as the decrease in wages reduces the expected 
lifetime returns of becoming a physician.
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On the other hand, the equilibrium wage rate could be increased due to an 
increase in the demand for medical care.  It would take several years for U.S. residents 
who are not already physicians to respond to the increase in wages by attending and 
graduating from medical school and residency programs.  Foreign medical graduates 
practicing outside the U.S. can respond more quickly to such an increase in expected 
wages. Thus, the physician labor supply is more elastic due to immigration of foreign 
physicians (Folland 2007).
6.2: Physician Immigration: Decision to Emigrate
Migration theory segregates the reasons for worker migration into two categories: 
supply-push factors and demand-pull factors.  Supply-push factors are generally negative 
factors in the home country that encourage workers to leave and seek work elsewhere, 
such as unfavorable employment conditions, poor healthcare, and lower wages.  Supply-
push factors are normally more important in migration decisions of workers from 
developing countries than from developed nations.  Demand-pull factors are those factors 
in the potential destination countries that attract foreign workers, including better living 
and working conditions and higher wages.  Networks also play an important role in 
migration decisions: potential immigrants often acquire information about living 
conditions, wages and employment in a potential destination country from people they 
know who already live there.  Furthermore, networks help immigrants in the assimilation 
process once in the new country (Clark 2006).
When the decision of a foreign medical doctor to migrate is primarily based on 
expected earnings (which is often the case), the decision will be determined by relative 
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wages in the U.S. and the foreign country in which the doctor currently lives, as well as 
migration costs and non-wage factors that affect a physician’s choice to move.  
Specifically, a physician will wish to migrate if:
ZCWW FUS >−− ,
where WUS and WF are the wage rates in the U.S. and the physician’s home country 
(foreign),  C is the cost of migrating, and Z represents the compensating differential in 
favor of staying in the home country, which is generally positive and reflects the fact that, 
all else equal, most potential migrants would prefer not to move.  Thus, the physician will 
wish to migrate if the increase in his wage, less the cost of moving, is greater than the 
value of his desire to stay in his home country (Vujicic 2004).
6.3 Exceptions to the Rule in the Healthcare Industry
The model predicts that an increase in the supply of physicians through 
immigration will, consistent with basic economic theory, cause wages to fall.  However, 
this result is complicated by many factors in the medical care industry.  First, it assumes 
that a foreign physician is a perfect substitute for a native one.  This assumption is likely 
to be violated, as patients may (rightly or wrongly) believe that a physician educated 
outside of the U.S. is of inferior quality.  Studies have generally found no difference in 
the quality of care provided by foreign medical graduates compared to U.S. medical 
graduates (Folland 2007).  Prejudices may exist even against foreign physicians educated 
in the U.S.  Patients have imperfect information regarding quality of care from any 
physician, native or foreign.  
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Furthermore, because they receive payment from third party payors including 
managed care companies, Medicare, and Medicaid, physicians are limited in the amount 
they can charge in some cases, and their compensation structure may not behave in the 
way theory would predict.  Specifically, physician wages are more likely to be “sticky” 
than wages in many other occupations.
On the other hand, there are at least two reasons that allow the effects of 
immigration on wages of physicians to be more easily identified than most other 
occupations: first, because physicians are subject to strict licensing requirements by 
states, there are unlikely to be many foreign physicians working illegally in the U.S.  
Therefore, it will not be necessary to attempt to estimate a measure of illegal 
immigration, for which there is little reliable data, a problem that has plagued many of 
the studies surveyed earlier.  Second, immigration can be considered as an importation of 
labor.  To the extent that production is shipped overseas or jobs are outsourced, policy 
decisions either limiting or encouraging immigration might be rendered meaningless.  
Although some outsourcing of medical care, and even physician care, does exist (media 
reports of U.S. citizens traveling to foreign countries for medical procedures which would 
otherwise be unaffordable to them come to mind), it is certainly very minimal compared 
to other occupations.  Physician care, unlike many labor services, is difficult to outsource.
6.4 Hypotheses of this Research
This research study hypothesizes that immigration of foreign physicians has a 
negative impact on area wages, and that this negative impact comes not only from the 
increase in physician supply caused by immigration but also from the fact that immigrant 
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physicians will be willing to accept lower wages than their native counterparts.  This 
research expects, however, that once country of education is controlled for, the results 
will show that immigration of foreign-educated doctors has a more negative impact on 
area wages than immigration of U.S.-educated foreign-born doctors.  This hypothesis is 
based on the idea that foreign-born doctors educated in the U.S. are likely to be more 
similar to their U.S. counterparts.  The researcher hypothesizes that an influx of U.S.-
born, foreign-educated doctors, on the other hand, will have a negative impact on area 
wages.  These physicians may be viewed as being of lower quality by potential 
employers.  
It is expected that wages will be higher in areas with more male physicians.  
Furthermore, wages are expected to increase with age, but at a decreasing rate.  An 
increase in the physician stock is anticipated to have a negative impact on area wages, 
consistent with basic economic theory of labor supply and demand.  
Finally, this researcher hypothesizes that, ceteris paribus, areas with a larger 
percentage of the population covered by Medicare B will have higher wages.  Medicare B 
patients are either disabled and/or over the age of 65; therefore, areas with more 
Medicare B patients are likely to have higher demand for physician services.
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Chapter 7: Research Methodology
7.1: The Basic Ordinary Least Squares Model
The intent of this research study is to test the hypothesis that immigration of 
foreign physicians, by increasing the supply of workers in the field, lowers the average 
wage of physicians in the United States.  The approach employed mimics the area 
analyses discussed earlier, while correcting for some criticisms of that approach, as will 
be described below.  Incorporating methods from Borjas (2005, 2006) and Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2007), the basic model takes the following form:
tatatatatata MedBTAXIw ,,432,1,0,ln εββββγβ ++++++= ,
where ln w represents the natural log of the average hourly wage of physicians indexed 
by MSA (a) and year (t).  Data have been sampled for every other year from 1997 to 
2007, rather than every year, due to budget constraints.  
I represents immigrant share and is measured as the number of foreign physicians 
in a given MSA in a given year relative to the total number of physicians: 
ta
ta
ciansTotalPhysi
siciansForeignPhy
I
,
,= .  γ is the parameter of interest; it measures the percent-change 
in area wages for a one percentage point increase in the immigrant share and is expected 
to be negative.  This method of calculating the percentage of immigrants (whether it be in 
general, or by specific occupation or education level and also at either the MSA, state, or 
national level)  and employing it as the measure of immigration has been previously 
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performed in studies by Altonji and Card (1991), Orrenius and Zavodny (2007), Borjas 
(2003) and Borjas (2005, 2006).
X is a vector that controls for the demographic characteristics of physicians in the 
MSA during the given year, including physician sex and age.  A and T represent area and 
year fixed-effects, respectively, and control for unobserved determinants of wages within 
a particular MSA or year.  The OLS regressions are performed both with and without the 
area fixed effects.  
MedB measures the percentage of the population in the physician’s service area 
that is covered by Medicare Part B.  This controls for the influence of large buyers, 
namely government programs and managed care companies, over physician charges.  
Managed care penetration rates have been shown to affect wages of medical 
professionals.  Hadley and Mitchell (1999) find evidence that higher HMO market 
penetration is associated with lower physician earnings.  However, their study is limited 
to a cross-section of data from 1990 and therefore does not address changes over time in 
physician earnings.   Buerhaus and Staiger (1996) use data from the Current Population 
Surveys for 1983 through 1994 to analyze the impact of managed care on employment 
and earnings of nurses.  Their research finds that managed care has been associated with 
a shift in employment away from hospitals to other settings (home health care, nursing 
homes, physician offices), but has had minimal effects on nurses’ wages.  Simon, 
Dranove and White (1997) analyze data published in the American Medical 
Association’s Socioeconomic Monitoring System survey from 1985 to 1993 and find that 
states with the fastest growth in managed care penetration experienced the highest growth 
rates in earnings of primary care physicians and the lowest growth rates in earnings of 
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radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists.  Due to difficulties in obtaining managed 
care penetration rate data, Medicare penetration rate data have been employed in this 
study.  Medicare is the largest single purchaser of healthcare in the U.S.  Furthermore, 
many managed care companies structure their pricing using a mark-up based on the 
Medicare Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) Reimbursement System.  
7.2: Extension of the Basic Model: Additional Variables
The first extension to the basic model is to control for changes in physician 
supply.  The variable S, calculated as ta
ta
Population
nsofPhysicia
S
,
,#=
is added to the regression.  
Note that this variable measures the actual number of physicians divided by the actual
population in a given area and year; this variable is not a sample statistic.  This variable 
measures the stock of physicians in a given MSA during a given year, and allows the 
effect of immigration on wages, holding the number of physicians constant, to be 
identified.  By adding the variable S, the study can determine whether immigration 
affects wages of physicians only because it increases the supply of physicians, or whether 
the effects are compounded because there is something specifically different about 
foreign doctors.  Now the parameter of interest, γ, measures specifically the effect that an 
increase in the proportion of foreign physicians has on wages in a given area.  If γ is 
negative, this suggests that foreign physicians are less productive than domestic ones or 
are willing to accept lower paying jobs.  Furthermore, if γ is more negative than in the 
analysis without the supply control, this would provide evidence that local physicians 
move out of the area in response to an influx of immigrant physicians.
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The next extension to the model is to control for whether the physician obtained 
their medical degree at a domestic or foreign medical school (for purposes of this 
analysis, Canadian medical schools are grouped with U.S. medical schools, consistent 
with the categorization of the American Medical Association). Simply including a 
variable that controls for foreign medical education would not be appropriate, as the 
effect of foreign medical education is likely to be different for foreign-born doctors and 
U.S.-born doctors.  Technically, there are four different categories of doctors to be 
considered: U.S.-born and educated (USBUSE), U.S.-born and foreign-educated 
(USBFE), foreign-born and foreign-educated (FBFE) and foreign-born educated in the 
U.S. (FBUSE).  Thus, three additional variables are added to the model, with U.S.-born 
and educated physicians being the base category for comparison.  The variable 
FBFE_Share is calculated as the total number of foreign-born, foreign-educated
physicians in the sample in a given area and year divided by the total number of 
physicians sampled in that area and year.  The variables FBUSE_Share and 
USBFE_share are similarly defined.   Adding these variables allows the determination of 
whether effects on wages are explained by country of birth or where the physician went 
to medical school, or both.
7.3: Extension of the Basic Model: Instrumental Variable Approach
The next specification of the model involves the incorporation of an instrumental 
variable to control for endogenous location choice.  As discussed earlier, results are 
potentially biased if physicians choose to move to areas where wages are already higher 
than others.  Results could also be biased if occupation-specific local productivity shocks 
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raise wages and encourage migration to a particular area.  In the presence of such 
endogeneity, the parameter estimates will be inconsistent and causation cannot be 
assumed (i.e., does immigration actually cause higher wages, or do higher wages attract 
immigrants?).  Prior studies including those of Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) and
Friedberg and Hunt (1995) have employed an instrumental variable to control for 
endogenous location choice.  An appropriate instrument is one that is correlated with 
immigration but not directly correlated with wages or the error term in the wage equation.  
Following Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001), the fraction of immigrants in a given 
MSA in 1990 can be used as an instrumental variable.  Bartel (1989) finds that the 
number of immigrants already living in a given area acts as a pull factor for future 
immigrants; thus, this variable should be correlated with immigrant inflows from 1997-
2007, the years which the study will analyze.  Furthermore, this variable does not directly 
relate to future wage increases.  The instrumental variable applied in this analysis is 
referred to as FB90 and calculated as:
1990,
1990,90
a
a
totalpop
npopforeignbor
FB = .
If immigrant share is likely to be endogenous, then the variable FBFE_Share is 
likely to be endogenous as well.  A second instrument FE_IV (the instrument for foreign 
education), constructed as FB90 multiplied by the share of physicians sampled in a given 
area and year who were educated abroad, is added to the model in the specifications that 
include this physician education variable.  This instrument is loosely based on Card 
(2001), where an instrumental variable is constructed using immigrant inflows multiplied 
by the fraction of immigrants in certain occupational groups (in the case of this study, the 
category of concern is educational, not occupational, group).   
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7.4: Extension of the Basic Model: First-Difference Approach
Finally, a first-difference approach, with and without the instrumental variable, is 
employed to control for area-specific factors that effect wages, endogenous location 
choice and the possibility that local physicians migrate away from cities when foreign 
doctors move in.  The first-difference approach examines changes in physician wages as 
a function of changes in the share of immigrant physicians within an MSA.  This method 
“abstract[s] from differences across cities that might bias a simpler cross-sectional 
analysis… the first differenced analysis… eliminates any bias introduced by city-specific 
fixed effects that are correlated with the fraction of immigrants in a city and the labor 
market outcomes of natives” (Altonji and Card 1991).  Furthermore, if immigrants move 
to a certain MSA because wages are high, but not because they expect them to rise more 
in the future, regressing the change in wage on the change in immigrant share will 
correctly identify the parameter of interest (Friedberg & Hunt 1995).  In this 
specification, the model to be estimated is as follows: 
As in earlier regressions, the variables FBFE_Share, FBUSE_Share, 
USBFE_Share and S, as well as the instrumental variables FB90 and FE_IV are added as 
additional specifications. The first-difference approach alleviates some of the potential 
bias that could be caused by area specific location choice factors; however, it does not 
completely solve the endogeneity problem.  Therefore, following Altonji and Card 
(1991), the instrumental variable approach can be combined with the first-difference 
approach to control for local economic conditions that attract immigrants.  According to 
Friedberg and Hunt (1995) an appropriate instrument that is correlated with changes in 
tatattatata MedBTXIw ,,32,1,,ln εβββγ ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆
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the immigrant share but does not directly influence changes in wages can be used “to 
remove the bias due to immigrant choice of regions with improving outcomes.”  Altonji 
and Card (1991) use the existing immigrant population as an instrumental variable; as 
previously explained, this analysis employs the instrument FB90, the existing foreign-
born population in an area according to the 1990 Census.
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Chapter 8: Data Sources and Building the Database
The data for this project come primarily from 4 sources: (1) the American 
Medical Association (AMA) Physician Masterfile, (2) the Occupational Employment 
Statistics (OES) Survey published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), (3) the Fee 
for Service Data published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and (4) data from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
8.1: The AMA Physician Masterfile
The Physician Masterfile, compiled annually by the American Medical 
Association (AMA), contains current and historical data on the over 940,000 physicians 
practicing in the U.S. and its territories, including more than 243,000 graduates of foreign 
medical schools.  The AMA maintains a high standard of accuracy in data collection and 
reporting.  
Relevant variables included in the Physician Masterfile data are: type of practice 
(hospital based, office based), state, county, PMSA/MSA and zip code of practice 
location, size of practice area (population), gender, birth date, birth country, licensure 
information, residency training information, medical school information including 
country and name of school attended, medical school graduation year and physician 
specialty.  The data on country of physician birth and country of medical school attended 
are of particular importance to this research study.  Data on country of birth allow the 
calculation of the share of immigrant physicians in a given MSA.  Data on country of 
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medical school allow further specifications of the model as described above, in order to 
determine whether there is a significant difference in the earnings of immigrant 
physicians educated abroad as compared to the United States.  Demographic variables, 
including gender and age are obtained from this data set.  
The AMA data are proprietary and can only be purchased subject to strict 
licensing agreements as to the use of said data.  A random sample of 184,563 
observations from the AMA Physician Masterfile Survey data was purchased from 
Medical Marketing Service, Inc. for purposes of this research.  Specifically, a random 
five year sample of 30,021 observations from the 1997 AMA survey data, 30,505 
observations from the 1999 survey, 30,708 from the 2001 survey, 31,201 from the 2003 
survey, 30,975 from the 2005 survey, and 31,153 from the 2007 survey were purchased.
The number of observations purchased and the number of years of data purchased were 
limited by budget constraints.
The greatest challenge involving the AMA data was the manipulation required on 
the birth country variable.  This variable did not contain a unique identifier for the 
country of origin of each physician.  Instead, it often contained a city and state of birth, a 
city and country, a country with a name misspelled, a country abbreviation, a city name 
only, or, in some cases, an identifier of “unknown”.  As whether the physician is foreign 
born or not is the most critical variable to the analysis, observations for which the birth 
country could not be identified as at least either foreign or U.S. had to be dropped.  After 
dropping these observations, 170,858 observations remained in the dataset.  For the 
remaining observations, the data had to be cleaned so that the countries of birth had a 
uniform description.  
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8.2: Wage Data from the Occupational Employment Statistics Survey
The physician observations from the AMA Masterfile were assigned a wage using 
the average wage for their specialty, practice area and survey year as obtained from the 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) Survey.  Published by the U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, the OES Survey reports average wage data for over 
800 occupations for 375 MSAs, 34 metropolitan divisions, and over 170 nonmetropolitan 
areas.  This study employs wage data for 1997 through 2007 from the OES Survey.
Although the AMA data assign each physician a detailed specialty code, with 
more than 200 possible specialties, the wage data for physicians for 1999 through 2007 
are reported by broad specialty code, including: anesthesiologists, family practitioners, 
internists, OB/GYN, pediatricians, psychiatrists, and surgeons.  Therefore, each specialty 
designation in the AMA database had to be assigned a broader specialty code to 
correspond with the OES wage data.  Physicians with specialties which clearly fell into 
one of the seven categories listed above were assigned wages based on that specialty.  
Physicians with other specialties, such as cardiology or urology, which did not clearly fit 
into one of the broad categories, were classified as “Other Specialty” and assigned the 
average wage of all physician specialties in their area for the given year.  
For physicians who practice within a primary metropolitan statistical area 
(PMSA), the OES data by MSA was employed.  However, for those physicians who do 
not practice within a PMSA or nonmetropolitan area for which wage data was collected
(i.e. they practice in rural areas), the average wage from the OES state wage data for their 
given specialty and year were used (the OES does not publish county-level occupational 
wage data). 
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The OES data for 1997 report only the average wage by area for “physicians and 
surgeons”; the data are not broken down more specifically by specialty.  Therefore, for 
each area (MSA or state-level, where appropriate) the average wage of all physician 
specialties for 1999 was calculated (as a second option, when data for a particular 
specialty and area were not available in 1999, the data for 2001 were employed).  Then, 
for each specialty, the average wage by area relative to the average of all specialties was 
calculated.  This ratio was then applied to the average wage in 1997 to conform to the 
data for later years.  For example, if in a particular MSA anesthesiologists earned 20% 
more than the average physician in 1999 (or 2001), it is assumed that anesthesiologists 
also earned 20% more than the average physician in that area in 1997.      
8.3: Medicare Enrollment Data
Medicare enrollment rates by county are reported in the Fee for Service Data 
published by the Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services for 1998 through 2006.  Medicare Part B is the arm of Medicare that 
covers physician services and is therefore the relevant variable to this study.  In order to 
calculate a Medicare Part B penetration rate, however, the percentage of the population 
covered by Medicare Part B, not the number of people, is required.  Thus, the Medicare 
data were merged with annual county population data published by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  Medicare penetration rates for each county and year were calculated.  In order to 
properly merge the Medicare penetration rate data with the AMA data and wage data, 
Medicare penetration rates for each physician’s practice area were required.  Since most 
physicians in the database practice within an MSA, the Medicare penetration rate data 
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needed to be recategorized from the county level to the PMSA level.  A list of counties 
within each PMSA was obtained from a geocode file available through The Ohio State 
University’s Center for Human Resource Research.  For PMSA’s consisting of more than 
one county, a weighted average Medicare penetration rate was calculated.  Medicare data 
were then merged with the AMA and wage data by PMSA or county, depending on 
whether the physician practiced within a PMSA or not.  Since Medicare penetration rate 
data were not available for 1997 or 2007 at the time this analysis was performed, 
physicians surveyed during 1997 were assigned the Medicare penetration rates for 1998 
and physicians surveyed during 2007 were assigned Medicare penetration rates for 2006.  
8.4: Data from the U.S. Census
In order to calculate the variable ta
ta
Population
nsofPhysicia
S
,
,#=
for the first extension of 
the model, population data by MSA were downloaded from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Population by MSA for the fifty U.S. states is available by year from 2000 through 2007.  
The population for earlier years was estimated using the population from the 1990 and 
2000 Census and assuming a constant linear growth rate.  Population data for the U.S. 
Virgin Islands and Guam are available only from Census 2000; therefore, this analysis is 
forced to assume that population in these territories did not change significantly between 
1997 and 2007.  Population data for Puerto Rico’s municipalities is available from 2000 
through 2007; Puerto Rico’s population is assumed to be unchanged from 1997 through 
2000.  The number of physicians employed by PMSA and year are reported in the OES 
data referenced above.  As data on the number of physicians employed by county are 
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unavailable, the use of this stock variable S will be limited to regression analysis of the 
PMSA areas only, and cannot be employed with regressions which include rural (non-
metropolitan) areas.  As will be discussed later, this limitation turns out to not be as 
problematic as it may seem.
Finally, the model required a measure of the immigrant population, as a fraction 
of total, by MSA (or county, when the physician did not practice within an MSA) in 1990 
to be used as an instrumental variable.  The foreign born population and native born 
populations, by MSA and county, are recorded in the 1990 Census were obtained from 
the U.S. Census Bureau online.
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Chapter 9: Descriptive Statistics of the Data
9.1: Country of Physician Birth
Of the 170,858 physicians sampled from the AMA survey for which country of 
birth was available, 26% (44,503) were born outside the U.S. (foreign-born) and 74% 
(126,355) were born in the U.S.  The proportion of foreign born physicians in each year 
sampled is roughly the same:
Table 2
Physician Sample: U.S.-Born and Foreign-Born by Year
Survey 
Year
#       
Foreign-Born
%       
Foreign-Born
#                      
U.S.-Born
%         
U.S.-Born Total
1997 7,421 26% 21,497 74% 28,918
1999 7,734 27% 21,337 73% 29,071
2001 7,658 27% 21,161 73% 28,819
2003 7,521 26% 21,280 74% 28,801
2005 7,181 26% 20,748 74% 27,929
2007 6,988 26% 20,332 74% 27,320
Total 44,503 26% 126,355 74% 170,858
Summary statistics of the key independent variable in this study, I, the share of 
immigrant physicians in a particular area, are reported by year in Table 3.
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Table 3
Summary Statistics of the Variable I = Immigrant Share
Year Mean Standard Deviation
1997 0.2566222 0.1417947
1999 0.2660383 0.1392615
2001 0.2657275 0.1390750
2003 0.2611368 0.1368208
2005 0.2571163 0.1332611
2007 0.2557833 0.1336291
The top twenty countries that most of the foreign-born physicians in the sample 
come from are reported in Table 4.  For a complete listing, see Table A1 in the Appendix.
Table 4
Foreign-Born Physicians Practicing in the U.S. by Country of Birth
Birth Country # of Physicians
% of Foreign-
Born Physicians
India 8,352 18.8%
The Philippines 3,905   8.8%
Canada 2,105   4.7%
Korea (South) 1,705   3.8%
Pakistan 1,523   3.4%
Iran 1,486   3.3%
China 1,343   3.0%
Cuba 1,252   2.8%
Germany 1,139   2.6%
United Kingdom 1,123   2.5%
Vietnam    999   2.2%
Taiwan    908   2.0%
Egypt    823   1.8%
Mexico    639   1.4%
Syria    601   1.4%
Poland    593   1.3%
Colombia    537   1.2%
Israel    516   1.2%
Argentina    484   1.1%
Nigeria    473   1.1%
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The largest single source country of immigrant physicians, by far, is India, 
followed by the Philippines.  This is not surprising, given the earlier review of literature 
that discussed the predominance of highly educated Asian immigrants.  Of the 44,503 
foreign-born physicians in the sample, only 11,353 (26%) come from advanced 
economies as defined by the International Monetary Fund.  The remaining 33,150 (74%) 
come from emerging and developing economies.  
9.2 Country of Medical School Attended
Of the 170,858 physicians in the sample, 21.9% (37,390) attended a medical 
school outside of the United States (foreign medical school) and 78.1% (133,468) 
attended medical school in the U.S.  Although, as expected, foreign-born doctors are 
much more likely to have attended a foreign medical school, a significant percentage of 
them did, in fact, attend medical school in the U.S.  Of all U.S.-born physicians sampled, 
only 4% attended medical school outside the U.S.  Meanwhile, 72% of foreign-born 
physicians were educated at foreign medical schools while 28% of them were actually 
educated here in the U.S.  These values are reported in Table 5.
Table 5
Location of Medical School Attended by Place of Birth
Place of Birth:
Location of School: United States Foreign
United States 120,890   96% 12,578   28%
Foreign     5,465     4% 31,925   72%
126,355 100% 44,503 100%
Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
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Summary statistics of the key variables measuring physician education,
FBFE_Share, FBUSE_Share, USBFE_Share, as well as the base category, 
USBUSE_Share, are reported in Table 6.
Table 6
Summary Statistics of the Birthplace/Education Variables
USBUSE_Share USBFE_Share FBFE_Share FBUSE_Share
Year Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
1997 .7092 .1570 .0336 .0587 .1944 .1271 .0620 .0475
1999 .7014 .1521 .0322 .0537 .1955 .1248 .0704 .0528
2001 .7006 .1536 .0337 .0580 .1926 .1235 .0730 .0529
2003 .7073 .1516 .0315 .0563 .1868 .1189 .0743 .0512
2005 .7118 .1475 .0309 .0569 .1785 .1145 .0785 .0535
2007 .7143 .1469 .0298 .0530 .1716 .1128 .0841 .0612
9.3: Physician Practice Area
Although the majority of all doctors sampled work in large MSAs, this is 
especially true of immigrant physicians.  Foreign physicians in the sample are more likely 
than U.S. doctors to practice in big cities and less likely than their native counterparts to 
work in small cities or rural areas.  U.S.-born physicians are more likely than their 
foreign-born counterparts to work in medium and small cities and rural areas.
Table 7
U.S. and Foreign-Born Physicians by Practice Area Size
MSA Population
# of U.S.-
Born 
Physicians
% of U.S. 
Born 
Physicians
# of Foreign-
Born 
Physicians
% of Foreign-
Born 
Physicians
A 1,000,000+ 82,567 65% 33,661 76%
B 250,000-999,999 20,319 16% 5,107 11%
C 100,000-249,999 9,163 7% 2,203 5%
D <100,000 1,091 1% 207 0%
N/A Rural 13,215 10% 3,325 7%
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
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This would seem to contradict the idea that foreign physicians serve in rural parts of 
America where doctors are scarce, and suggests that policies encouraging physicians to 
locate in these areas are unsuccessful.  However, the result that foreign physicians are 
more likely to work in big cities does not invalidate the theory that they are serving in 
shortage areas per se; the Health Professional Shortage Areas and Medically Underserved 
Areas as defined by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services are comprised of 
rural areas as well as inner city areas in large cities, or anywhere that there is a shortage 
of primary medical care, dental, or mental health providers.  
Table 8 reports the twenty MSAs with the largest number of foreign-born 
physicians sampled.  The number of foreign-born physicians in the sample in each MSA, 
for all MSAs in the sample, can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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Table 8
Foreign-Born Physicians by MSA
MSA
# of Foreign-Born 
Physicians
% of Total Foreign-
Born Physicians
New York, NY 3,669 8.2%
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 2,380 5.3%
Chicago, IL 2,139 4.8%
Boston, MA 1,317 3.0%
Washington, DC-MD-VA 1,315 3.0%
Detroit, MI 1,064 2.4%
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 1,056 2.4%
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 1,047 2.4%
Miami, FL    985 2.2%
Houston, TX    941 2.1%
Orange County, CA    777 1.7%
Baltimore, MD    679 1.5%
Cleveland, OH    641 1.4%
Newark, NJ    512 1.2%
St. Louis, MO-IL    511 1.1%
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA    506 1.1%
Bergen-Passaic, NJ    505 1.1%
Atlanta, GA    504 1.1%
San Francisco, CA    490 1.1%
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX    483 1.1%
9.4: Physician Demographic Characteristics
Foreign-born doctors in the sample tended to be slightly older: the mean age of 
foreign born doctors in the sample is 48.69 (standard deviation: 12.83) and the mean age 
of U.S. born doctors in the sample is 47.16 (standard deviation: 13.21).  For both groups 
of doctors, the median occurs between ages 51 and 60.    
Table 9 reports the percent of U.S.-born and foreign-born physicians working in 
each size MSA by age group.  
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Table 9
Physicians by Age and Size of Practice Area
U.S.-Born Physicians
MSA Size
Age A B C D Rural Total
20-30 75% 15% 6% 0% 4% 100%
31-40 68% 16% 7% 1% 9% 100%
41-50 63% 17% 8% 1% 12% 100%
51-60 63% 16% 8% 1% 12% 100%
61+ 65% 15% 7% 1% 12% 100%
Foreign-Born Physicians
MSA Size
Age A B C D Rural Total
20-30 85% 9% 4% 0% 2% 100%
31-40 76% 11% 5% 1% 7% 100%
41-50 74% 13% 5% 0% 7% 100%
51-60 74% 12% 5% 0% 8% 100%
61+ 76% 11% 4% 0% 8% 100%
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
The previously discovered phenomenon that foreign-born doctors are more likely 
to practice in large cities than their native-born counterparts holds across all age groups.  
The same is true for the conclusion that U.S.-born physicians are more likely than their 
foreign-born counterparts to work in rural areas.  Younger doctors, no matter where they 
were born, are most likely to live in the largest MSAs, while older physicians are more 
likely than younger physicians to practice in rural areas.  
Table 10 reports the sex of physicians sampled by birthplace and year.  There are 
notably more men than women in the sample: 119,309 men compared with only 42,526 
women.  Foreign-born physicians are more likely to be female.  This is especially the 
case in earlier years of the survey; in 1997, 27% of foreign-born physicians sampled were 
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female compared with only 22% of U.S.-born physicians.  This difference tends to 
decrease over time as the gap between native-born male and female doctors has been 
narrowing since 1997.  In fact, for both foreign-born and U.S.-born doctors as well as for 
all doctors combined, the proportion of doctors who are female has been increasing since 
1997.  The number and percentage of physicians born in the U.S. and abroad, by sex and 
by year, are reported in the Appendix in Table A3.
Table 10
Sex of Physician by Place of Birth and Year
U.S-Born Physicians 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Female 22% 23% 24% 26% 28% 29%
Male 78% 77% 76% 74% 72% 71%
Foreign-Born Physicians 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Female 27% 29% 29% 30% 31% 30%
Male 73% 71% 71% 70% 69% 70%
Total (All Physicians) 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Female 23% 24% 25% 27% 29% 29%
Male 77% 76% 75% 73% 71% 71%
Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
For purposes of this analysis, physicians were grouped into the seven categories 
of specialties reported in the OES wage data: anesthesiology, family/general practice, 
internal medicine, OB/GYN, pediatrics, psychiatry, and surgery.  Those physicians 
whose specialties did not fall into one of these major categories were classified as 
“other”.  The number of physicians by specialty and sex are reported in Table 11.  
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Table 11
Physician Specialty by Sex
Specialty All Physicians Male Female
Anesthesiology 8,939 5% 7,030 6% 1,909 4%
Family/General Practice 23,212 14% 16,767 13% 6,445 14%
Internal Medicine 24,089 14% 16,892 13% 7,197 16%
OBGYN 10,337 6% 6,320 5% 4,017 9%
Pediatrics 14,760 9% 7,258 6% 7,502 17%
Psychiatry 10,900 6% 7,332 6% 3,568 8%
Surgery 27,232 16% 24,096 19% 3,136 7%
Other Specialty 51,389 30% 40,429 32% 10,960 25%
Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
As can be seen in the table, men are much more likely than women to specialize in 
surgery and somewhat more likely to specialize in anesthesiology.  Women, on the other 
hand, are more likely to specialize in psychiatry, and are far more likely than men to 
specialize in OB/GYN.  These specialty choices become important later in this paper in 
explaining differences in the wages between men and women.
The specialties of foreign-born and native physicians as well as those educated at 
U.S. medical schools and abroad are reported in Table 12.  
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Table 12
Physician Specialty by U.S. / Foreign Birth and Education
Specialty U.S.-Born Foreign-Born
U.S. Med 
School
Foreign Med 
School
Anesthesiology 6,171 5% 2,768 6% 6,550 5% 2,389 6%
Family/General 
Practice 18,515 15% 4,697 11% 19,003 14% 4,209 11%
Internal 
Medicine 16,170 13% 7,919 18% 17,311 13% 6,778 18%
OBGYN 7,815 6% 2,522 6% 8,289 6% 2,048 5%
Pediatrics 10,725 8% 4,035 9% 11,242 8% 3,518 9%
Psychiatry 7,664 6% 3,236 7% 7,750 6% 3,150 8%
Surgery 21,858 17% 5,374 12% 23,373 18% 3,859 10%
Other Specialty 37,437 30% 13,952 31% 39,950 30% 11,439 31%
Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
As family/general practice and internal medicine are very similar specialties, grouping 
them together for comparative purposes, there are approximately the same proportion of 
general practitioners in the sample of U.S.-born and foreign-born doctors.  In fact, the 
percentages of physicians in each specialty are almost exactly the same across birthplace 
with the notable exception of surgery: U.S. born physicians are more likely to be 
surgeons than their foreign-born counterparts.  A similar conclusion can be drawn when 
comparing physicians educated at medical schools located within and outside the U.S.: 
physicians educated in the U.S. are much more likely to become surgeons, but there are 
no other remarkable differences in specialty choice.  
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9.5: Wages of Physicians: Summary Statistics
Although the AMA sample produced 170,858 observations for which physician 
country of birth was available, there are a few cases where the OES database did not 
report a wage for a particular physician specialty or locality for a given year.  Thus, after 
merging the AMA physician survey data with the OES wage data, wages were available 
and assigned to 161,835 physicians.  In the discussion that follows, it is important to keep 
in mind that “physician wages” are not necessarily the actual wages of the physician 
sampled; they are the average wage for the physician’s specialty in the physician’s 
practice area in the relevant year.  
The mean hourly wage of all the wages assigned to the physicians in the sample is 
$65.87893 with a standard deviation of $15.14222.  Physician wages ranged from a low 
of $10.20 per hour to a high of $103.00.  The average wages by year are reported in 
Table 13.
Table 13
Average Physician Wages by Year
Year Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation Min Max
1997 49.37990 7.693108 10.20 95.16
1999 55.56695 8.231586 16.10 70.00
2001 58.51647 7.523859 14.32 69.92
2003 75.34824 14.27231 17.00 101.28
2005 74.52094 11.43191 21.15 94.00
2007 78.43643 11.46004 24.00 103.00
The wages assigned to women in the sample were, on average, lower than those 
assigned to men.  The mean wage of women is estimated to be $65.378 per hour 
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(standard deviation: $14.92697) while the mean wage of men is estimated to be 
$66.05748 per hour (standard deviation: $15.21429).  The averages of the wages assigned 
to male and female physicians by year are reported in Table 14.
Table 14
Average Physician Wages by Sex
Men Women
Year Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation
1997 49.73773 7.568217 48.14859 7.987421
1999 55.82967 8.229977 54.74475 8.182890
2001 58.87995 7.492362 57.44544 7.514875
2003 76.09952 14.31077 73.32031 13.96856
2005 75.21550 11.30691 72.78799 11.55812
2007 79.01703 11.32920 77.02602 11.65265
A comparison of means test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the average wage assigned to men compared to women and supports the 
alternative hypothesis that women, on average, are more likely to live in areas where 
wages are lower and/or specialize in lower paying fields:
Table 15
Comparison of Means Test: Wages by Sex
Sex              Observations   Mean Wage  Standard Error   95% Confidence Interval
 F           42,526           65.37800        .0723843           65.23613 - 65.51988
 M           119,309 66.05748 .0440469 65.97115 - 66.14381
 Total           161,835           65.87893        .0376403           65.80516 - 65.95271
 Difference  -.6794786        .0855025 -.8470616 - -.5118956
 Difference = mean(F) - mean(M)                                                t =  -7.9469
 Ho: Difference = 0                                 degrees of freedom =   161,833
      Ha: diff < 0                                   Ha: diff = 0                               Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000                      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000                    Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
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The data further suggest that foreign-born doctors are more likely to earn slightly 
less than U.S.-born physicians.  The mean wage of native-born physicians in the sample 
is estimated to be $65.96572 per hour (standard deviation: $15.29789) while the mean 
wage of foreign-born doctors is estimated to be $65.62861 per hour (standard deviation: 
$14.68132).  The averages of the wages assigned to U.S.-born and foreign-born 
physicians by year, based on specialty and practice area, are reported in Table 16.
Table 16
Average Physician Wages: U.S.-Born and Foreign Born
U.S.-Born Foreign-Born
Year Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation
1997 49.39742 7.822257 49.31997 7.234232
1999 55.73508 8.260620 55.11172 8.135574
2001 58.57167 7.564645 58.36383 7.408262
2003 75.53049 14.40141 74.83422 13.88978
2005 74.71374 11.58896 73.96442 10.94773
2007 78.63872 11.68048 77.84919 10.77394
A comparison of means test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the average wage assigned to immigrant physicians compared to native-born 
doctors and supports the alternative hypothesis that foreign-born doctors, on average, are 
more likely to live in areas where wages are lower and/or specialize in lower paying 
fields.
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Table 17
Comparison of Means Test: Wages by Birthplace
Birthplace     Observations   Mean Wage  Standard Error   95% Confidence Interval
 U.S.     120,171           65.96572        .0441298           65.87923 – 66.05222
 Foreign        41,664 65.62861 .0719258 65.48763 – 65.76958
 Total                161,835           65.87893        .0376403           65.80516 – 65.95271
 Difference               .3371175        .0860848            .1683932 - .5058418
 Difference = mean(U.S.) - mean(Foreign)              t =  3.9161
 Ho: Difference = 0                          degrees of freedom =   161,833
      Ha: diff < 0                                   Ha: diff = 0                               Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000                      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001                    Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
Physicians educated at foreign medical schools seem to earn considerably less 
than those educated at medical schools in the U.S.; the difference in wages appears to be 
more drastic than the difference in wages based on place of birth.  The mean wage of 
U.S. educated physicians in the sample is estimated to be $66.245 per hour (standard 
deviation: $15.10868) while the mean wage of foreign educated doctors is estimated to be 
$64.55275 per hour (standard deviation: $15.18964).  The averages of the wages assigned 
to physicians by location of medical school and year, based on specialty and practice 
area, are reported in Table 18.
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Table 18
Average Physician Wages: by Location of Medical School Attended
U.S.-Educated Foreign-Educated
Year Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation
1997 49.57645 7.427113 48.62338 8.599974
1999 55.84859 8.082030 54.63304 8.644367
2001 58.66989 7.399834 57.99196 7.911378
2003 75.79231 14.03253 73.76393 14.99110
2005 74.80303 11.28907 73.45767 11.89602
2007 78.83199 11.34080 76.87175 11.79168
A comparison of means test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the average wage assigned to physicians educated abroad compared to those 
educated in the U.S. and supports the alternative hypothesis that doctors who attended 
foreign medical schools, on average, are more likely to live in areas where wages are 
lower and/or specialize in lower paying fields:
Table 19
Comparison of Means Test: Wages by Location of Medical School Attended
Med School  Observations   Mean Wage  Standard Error   95% Confidence Interval
 U.S.    126,827           66.24500        .0424249           66.16185 – 66.32815
 Foreign     35,008 64.55275 .0811827 64.39363 – 64.71187
 Total                161,835           65.87893        .0376403           65.80516 – 65.95271
 Difference                               1.692255        .0913224            1.513265 – 1.871245
 Difference = mean(U.S.) - mean(Foreign)                                       t =  18.5305
 Ho: Difference = 0                                                 degrees of freedom =   161,833
      Ha: diff < 0                                   Ha: diff = 0                               Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000                      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000                    Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
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These results suggest that location of medical school may be a more important factor in 
determining wages than birthplace.
A comparison of wages by both birthplace and location of medical school 
reveals an interesting result: the estimated wage of U.S.-born physicians educated abroad 
is the lowest of all physicians.  This could be explained if U.S. born physicians who are
educated abroad are doing so out of necessity; perhaps they are of lower quality in terms 
of scholastic achievement and cannot get accepted to medical school in the U.S.  The 
comparison of means tests of estimated wages of U.S. and foreign-born physicians by 
location of medical school are reported in Table 20.  
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Table 20
Comparison of Means Test: 
Wages by Birthplace and Location of Medical School Attended
U.S.-Born Physicians
Med School  Observations   Mean Wage  Standard Error   95% Confidence Interval
 U.S.      115,017           66.17106        .0445914           66.08366 – 66.25846
 Foreign           5,154 61.38346 .2534297 60.88663 – 61.88029
 Total      120,171           65.96572        .0376403           65.87923 – 66.05222
 Difference                               4.787601        .2173727            4.361554 – 5.213648
 Difference = mean(U.S.) - mean(Foreign)                                       t =  22.0249
 Ho: Difference = 0    degrees of freedom =   120,169
      Ha: diff < 0                                   Ha: diff = 0                               Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000                      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000                    Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
Foreign-Born Physicians
Med School  Observations   Mean Wage  Standard Error   95% Confidence Interval
 U.S.  11,810           66.96512        .1375882           66.69542 – 67.23482
 Foreign       29,854 65.09989 .0841467 64.93496 – 65.26482
 Total                  41,664           65.62861        .0719258           65.48763 – 65.76958
 Difference                               1.865227        .1593351            1.552927 – 2.177527
 Difference = mean(U.S.) - mean(Foreign)                                         t =  11.7063
 Ho: Difference = 0                              degrees of freedom =   41,662
      Ha: diff < 0                                   Ha: diff = 0                               Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000                      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000                    Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
For both U.S.-born and immigrant physicians, the null hypothesis that there is no
significant difference in average wages of physicians educated in U.S. or foreign medical 
schools is rejected in favor of the alternative, that physicians educated in the U.S. are 
more likely to live in areas and/or specialize in fields for which wages are higher.
As previously explained, wages were assigned to physicians based on practice 
area (PMSA, MSA or state, where applicable) and specialty.  For all years and areas in 
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the sample, surgeons are the highest paid of all specialists with an average hourly wage of 
$74.05, while family/general practitioners and psychiatrists tend to be the lowest paid 
with average wages of $59.95 and $60.07 per hour, respectively.  The average wages by 
specialty for all years and areas in the sample, as well as estimated wages by place of 
birth and education, are reported in Tables 21 through 23.
Table 21
Average Wages by Physician Specialty
Specialty Mean Wage Standard Deviation
Anesthesiology 69.86168 18.35551
Family/General Practitioners 59.94589 13.87846
Internal Medicine 66.40683 14.91470
OB/GYN 70.66007 16.42572
Pediatrics 60.99174 13.40880
Psychiatry 60.06922 13.41130
Surgeons 74.05098 16.18843
Other 64.97257 12.49072
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Table 22
Average Wages by Physician Specialty and Birthplace
U.S.-Born Foreign-Born
Specialty Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation
Anesthesiology 69.83370 18.38523 69.92542 18.29101
Family/General 
Practitioners
60.11647 13.85956 59.26293 13.93452
Internal Medicine 66.18644 15.11365 66.86565 14.48198
OB/GYN 70.59882 16.49930 70.85211 16.19482
Pediatrics 61.18670 13.53934 60.46149 13.03417
Psychiatry 59.90264 13.56181 60.47003 13.03556
Surgeons 74.17250 16.32209 73.54924 15.61601
Other 64.99336 12.64371 64.91615 12.06612
Table 23
Average Wages by Physician Specialty and Location of Med School Attended
U.S.-Educated Foreign-Educated
Specialty Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation Mean Wage
Standard 
Deviation
Anesthesiology 70.14947 18.32521 69.05622 18.42028
Family/General 
Practitioners
60.48336 13.51183 57.50910 15.19694
Internal Medicine 66.40421 14.92556 66.41366 14.88749
OB/GYN 70.90430 16.32767 69.65452 16.79034
Pediatrics 61.38920 13.35084 59.68996 13.51736
Psychiatry 60.09691 13.46288 60.00015 13.28386
Surgeons 74.29921 16.18393 72.52526 16.13460
Other 65.16821 12.43361 64.28210 12.66670
As reported earlier in Table 11, women in the sample were more likely to be
general practitioners or to specialize in OB/GYN, pediatrics or psychiatry.  Wages for 
these specialties, with the exception of OB/GYN, tend to be lower than other specialties.  
Men, on the other hand, are more likely to specialize in anesthesiology and surgery, 
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which are two of the highest-paying fields.  This provides evidence that differences in 
pay by sex may be attributable to specialty choice, and not necessarily based on 
discrimination. 
As reported in Table 12, U.S. born physicians were more likely to specialize in 
surgery than their immigrant counterparts.  Again, as surgery is the highest paid specialty, 
differences in average physician wages by birth country might be explained by specialty 
choice.  Similarly, graduates of foreign medical schools were more likely to be general 
practitioners and much less likely to be surgeons; therefore, the fact that graduates of 
foreign medical schools are estimated to have lower wages than doctors educated in the 
U.S. might also be at least partially explained by specialty.  In this case, specialty could 
refer to specialty choice, or lack thereof, if foreign medical graduates specialize in other 
fields but must resort to practicing general medicine in the U.S.
Interestingly, when comparing the estimated wages of U.S.-born and foreign-born 
physicians by specialty, overall the wages tend to be quite similar.  However, when 
comparing estimated wages of physicians educated in the U.S. and abroad, the wage 
estimates for physicians educated at foreign medical schools are noticeably lower than 
physicians educated in the U.S.  This implies that lower average wages of physicians 
educated outside the U.S. may result from specialty choice as well as location of practice 
area, with foreign-educated physicians locating in areas where wages are already lower or 
where migration of foreign-educated physicians actually causes wages to be lower in a 
specific area.  
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Chapter 10: Regression Results
10.1: Variable Summary
A summary of the variables employed in this study is reported in Table 24.  It is 
important to note that in the following regression analyses, the dependent variable, the 
natural log of wages lnw, is not the actual wage of the individual physician sampled from 
the survey.  Instead, average physician wages as reported in the Occupational 
Employment Statistics survey were assigned to the physicians sampled by specialty, 
MSA or state, where applicable, and year.  
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Table 24
Summary of Variables
Variable Description
Ln wa,t Dependent variable, natural log of the average hourly wage rate of 
physicians by specialty, indexed by area and year
Ia,t Immigration share, percentage of physicians in a given area and year 
who are foreign-born
Male Dummy variable = 1 if physician is male, = 0 if female
Age Physician age
Age2 Square of physician age
MedBa,t Percentage of population in physician’s service area in a given year 
who are covered by Medicare Part B
FBFE_
Sharea,t
Foreign-born foreign-educated share, percentage of immigrant 
physicians in a given area and year who attended a foreign medical 
school
FBUSE_
Sharea,t
Foreign-born U.S.-educated share, percentage of immigrant 
physicians in a given area and year who attended a U.S. medical 
school
USBFE_
Sharea,t
U.S.-born foreign-educated share, percentage of native-born 
physicians in a given area and year who attended a foreign medical 
school
Sa,t Physician Stock, number of physicians as a percentage of the area 
population in a given year
FB90 Instrumental Variable: percentage of area population that was 
foreign-born as of the 1990 Census
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The correlations between the independent variables employed in this analysis are 
reported in Table 25.
Table 25
Pairwise Correlations between Independent Variables
Variable: I
FBFE
Share
FBUSE
Share
USBFE
Share Male Age Age2 MedB S
I 1.000
FBFE 1.000
FBUSE 0.109 1.000
USBFE 0.082 -0.043 1.000
Male -0.028 -0.011 -0.048 0.055 1.000
Age 0.030 0.040 -0.013 0.040 0.239 1.000
Age2 0.036 0.044 -0.007 0.040 0.229 0.987 1.000
MedB -0.144 0.001 -0.370 0.051 0.065 0.047 0.039 1.000
S 0.033 0.014 0.060 -0.048 -0.019 0.011 0.011 -0.104 1.000
10.2: Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Least Squares Results
The OLS and 2SLS estimates of the impact of immigration on area wages are 
reported in Table 26.  Estimation of these regressions is performed at the individual level, 
where the immigrant share in an area and year are regressed on the natural log of the 
wage assigned to the individual physicians sampled.  All regressions include time fixed
effects and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 26
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Relationship between Immigration and Physician Wages
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Physician Wages: ln w
Independent Variable
(1) OLS w/ Time Fixed Effects
      (a)                       (b)                        (c)
(2) 2SLS w/ Time Fixed Effects
      (a)                       (b)                        (c)
I = Immigrant Share -0.0131 *** -0.0720 *** -0.1688 *** -0.1723 ***
(.0031) (.0044) (.0055) (.0058)
FBFE_Share 0.0564 *** -0.0696 ***
(.0057) (.0065)
FBUSE_Share -0.1621 *** -0.4770 ***
(.0143) (.0253)
USBFE_Share -1.2630 ***
(.0254)
Male 0.0306 *** 0.0310 *** 0.0297 *** 0.0289 *** 0.0295 *** 0.0295 ***
(.0010) (.0011) (.0011) (.0009) (.0010) (.0010)
Age 0.0011 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0007 ***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Age2 -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 ***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
MedB 0.4714 *** 0.5449 *** 0.7278 *** 0.3673 ** 0.5627 *** 0.3526 ***
(.0117) (.0168) (.0185) (.0113) (.0152) (.0212)
S = Physician Stock -0.4487 *** -0.4994 *** -0.4643 *** -0.4696 ***
(.0102) (.0105) (.0102) (.0103)
First-Stage 
F-Test of Instrument 68,737 96,185
23,569 
29,492
# of obs 161,811 129,375 129,375 159,448 128,074 128,074
R-Squared 0.4946 0.5076 0.5491 0.5483 0.5513 0.5508
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note: Parts (1)(b), (1)(c), (2)(b) and (2)(c) have fewer observations due to lack of data on the physician stock variable.
2SLS regressions have fewer variables due to lack of data on the instrumental variable.
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The first specification of the model (1) employs an ordinary least squares 
analysis, with time dummy variables to control for time fixed effects, to test for the 
impact of immigration on local area wages.  The joint test of significance reveals that, for 
all three specifications (1)(a), (1)(b) and (1)(c), the included independent variables are 
significant in explaining variation in area wages at the 1% level.  The R-squared 
coefficients of determination indicate that between 49.46% and 54.91% of the variability 
in wages can be explained by the regression models above.   
The first regression run, (1)(a), indicates a highly significant, although practically 
small, impact of immigration on local wages.  Specifically, areas with a one percentage 
point larger immigrant share (where the immigrant share is the percentage of doctors in 
the area who are foreign-born), ceteris paribus, have 0.0131% lower wages, on average.  
Adding the variable S (1)(b), which measures the stock of physicians, the 
percentage of physicians in a given area and year relative to total population, controls for 
the increase in supply that occurs when an immigrant physician moves to an area and the
possibility that, in response, other physicians move away from the area.  The coefficient 
on this variable is negative, as expected, large and highly significant.  All else constant, 
areas with one percentage point more physicians per capita have 0.4487% lower average
wages.  This result is consistent with the basic supply and demand theory that an increase 
in supply, holding demand constant, should result in a lower wage.  After including this 
supply control, the negative effects of immigration become larger, and remain significant 
at the 1% level.  In this case, holding physician supply constant, a one percentage point
increase in the number of foreign physicians in a given area is predicted to result in 
.0720% lower area wages, on average.  The result that the effect is smaller when supply 
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is not held constant suggests that local physicians may respond to the lower wages caused 
by an influx of immigrant physicians by moving away from the area.
The third specification of the OLS regression model (1)(c) adds controls for 
country of education.  Specifically, the three variables FBFE_Share, FBUSE_Share, and 
USBFE_Share are added to the model, with U.S.-born and educated physicians omitted 
as the base group for comparison purposes.  The coefficients on all three of these 
birth/education variables are significant at the 1% level.  Areas with a one percentage 
point larger share of physicians who were born and educated abroad are predicted to have 
0.0564% higher wages, on average.  Areas with a one percentage point larger share of 
physicians born in a foreign country but educated in the U.S. are predicted to have 
0.1621% lower wages, on average, and areas with a one percentage point larger share of 
physicians born in the U.S. but educated abroad are predicted to have 1.263% lower 
average wages.  
These results provide evidence that the negative impacts of immigration come not 
from foreign born and educated doctors, but from immigrant physicians who are educated 
in the U.S.  At first this result may seem counterintuitive, but there is a probable 
explanation for it.  Foreign-born, U.S.-educated physicians could be one of two types: 
those who migrated to the U.S. as small children and grew up in America and those who 
came to the United States as adults for purposes of higher education.  Both groups of 
physicians may have benefited from university and medical school admissions policies 
that favor foreign students.  Furthermore, the latter group likely is less restricted by visa
issues as the longer they have been in the U.S., the more likely that they have achieved 
resident alien or citizen status.  Foreign-born and educated physicians, on the other hand, 
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immigrated at some point in their lives after achieving their medical degree.  They are 
more likely than their U.S.-educated counterparts to have entered the United States 
through the H-1B visa program by a sponsored employer or through the O visa program 
as an extraordinary physician in their field.  In either of these cases, the foreign-born 
foreign-educated physician is likely to be either the cream of the crop in their specialty or 
one who is extremely driven and dedicated to achieve his or her goals.  This theory is 
consistent with the findings of Chiswick (1999) that migrants tend to be favorably self-
selected.  Thus, it is certainly plausible that these physicians do actually earn higher 
wages than their foreign-born, U.S.-educated counterparts.
The physicians who seem to have the most negative effect on wages are those 
born in the U.S. but educated abroad.  This result is likely explained because U.S.-born 
physicians who attend a foreign medical school do so out of necessity; they may not have 
been accepted to a U.S. medical school.  Therefore, they may be of lower quality which 
would result in them being more likely to practice as general practitioners than high paid 
specialists, potentially having less selection as far as jobs are concerned and thus being 
forced to work in less desirable, lower paying areas, and being less productive and thus 
paid a lower wage on average.
As previously discussed, the results of the OLS regressions likely suffer from 
endogeneity bias because immigrant location is not randomly selected but, rather, chosen 
by the immigrant.  The results of the 2SLS analysis are previously reported in Table 26.  
In the first two specifications (2)(a) and (2)(b), where the measure of immigration is 
represented by I, the immigrant share, the instrument FB90, the foreign-born share of the 
area’s population in 1990, has been employed.  The results of the first stage regressions 
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reveal that the instrument is highly significant in predicting I after controlling for the 
other independent regressors.  Specifically, there is a strong positive relationship between 
the foreign-born population share in an area in 1990 and the current share of immigrant 
physicians.  The F-Test of the significance of the instrument is extremely significant and 
shows that the instrument passes the first requirement, that it be highly correlated with I
and significant in the first-stage regressions.  The second assumption, that FB90 is not 
correlated with the error term and is therefore not directly related to current wages, 
cannot be tested.  Following the earlier research of Altonji and Card (1991) and Card 
(2001), this study assumes that the second condition is satisfied.
The results of the second-stage regressions show a highly significant negative 
effect of immigration on wages.  In this case, the negative effect is even larger than 
reported in the OLS regressions.  A one percentage point increase in the share of 
immigrant physicians in an area is associated with 0.1688% to 0.1723% lower average 
physician wages.  The result that the negative impacts of immigration as measured by the 
2SLS approach which controls for endogenous location choice are more negative than the 
OLS results provides evidence that immigrants are in fact drawn to areas where wages 
are higher prior to their arrival.  
A comparison of the results from the OLS regression (1)(b) and the 2SLS 
regressions (2)(b) provides evidence that local physicians respond to the decrease in 
wages caused by immigration by moving out of the area, and that the lowest paid 
physicians in the area are more likely to move out than the higher paid physicians.  These
two specifications of the model include the physician supply control variable S, and 
measure the impact of immigration on wages holding physician supply constant.  
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However, this does NOT mean that these analyses do not allow local physicians to move 
out.  Specifically, holding physician supply constant requires that for each physician 
moving into the area, one physician must move out.  The results of the 2SLS analysis are 
more negative than those of the OLS regression; adding the control for endogeneity 
indicates that the true impact of immigration is more negative than is observable using 
the OLS approach.  If immigrant physicians move into an area and drive out the lowest 
paid physicians, the decrease in average physician wages in the area would be offset by 
the flight of these low paid doctors, and the average wage observed in the area would be 
higher than it would have been if these lowest paid physicians had remained in the area.
Performing the 2SLS analysis on the impact of immigration by country of medical 
school on area wages requires the inclusion of not only the instrument FB90 but also the 
FE_IV, the calculation of which was described earlier in Chapter 7.3.  The results of the 
first stage regressions show a strong and highly statistically significant correlation 
between both instruments and the two endogenous regressors, FBFE_Share and 
FBUSE_Share. The F-tests for joint significance of the instruments in the regression of 
FBFE_Share and FBUSE_Share on the instruments and other exogenous regressors 
produce a value of 29,492 and 23,569, respectively, and show that the two instruments 
are highly significant in predicting immigrant share by country of education.  
Breaking down the results of the 2SLS analysis by location of medical school 
attended in part (2)(c) also produces a uniformly more negative effect of immigration on 
wages.  The coefficient on the FBFE_Share variable (foreign-born, foreign-educated 
share of physicians in an area) changes signs from positive to negative and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Specifically, after controlling for endogenous location choice, 
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a one percentage point increase in the foreign-born, foreign-educated share of physicians 
in an area is associated with a 0.0696% decrease in average wages.  A one percentage 
point increase in the foreign-born, U.S.-educated share of physicians in an area is 
associated with a 0.477% decrease in average area wages.  This effect is also statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The negative impacts of immigration remain larger for the 
foreign-born, U.S.-educated physicians, the explanation for which was previously 
discussed.  The change in sign of the FBFE_Share variable and the increase in the 
magnitude of the negative coefficient on the FBUSE_Share variable both support the 
previous hypotheses that immigrant physicians, regardless of where they are educated, 
are drawn to areas where wages are higher, and that local physicians, particular those 
from the low end of the pay scale, move out of the area in response to an influx of 
immigration, diffusing the potential negative wage impacts of the immigrant physicians.
The 2SLS analysis controlling for both country of birth and education had to be 
performed without the inclusion of the USBFE_Share variable.  This variable is likely 
endogenous as well, as U.S.-born, foreign-educated physicians are just as likely to be 
drawn to higher paying locations as foreign-born physicians are.  However, without a 
valid third instrument it is not possible to include this variable in the analysis.  Thus, the 
base category that the wage impacts of FBFE and USBFE physicians is to be compared 
to is all U.S.-born physicians, regardless of where they were educated.  As the focus of 
this study is to determine the impact of immigration of foreign physicians on wages, this 
limitation does not substantially hinder the research.
The signs of all of the demographic characteristic variables in parts (1) and (2) are 
as expected and all are significant at the 1% level.  Male doctors are expected to be paid
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about 3% higher wages, on average, than females.  Physicians’ wages increase with age 
but at a decreasing rate.  
The coefficient on MedB is large, positive, and highly significant.  Areas where 
one percentage point more of the population are covered by Medicare Part B are 
associated with 0.3526% to 0.7278% higher physician wages, on average, depending on 
the specification of the model employed.  The strong positive impact is likely due to areas 
with a higher percentage of patients covered by Medicare Part B having higher demand 
for physician services and, perhaps, also because physicians are more likely to actually 
receive payment when a patient is covered by Medicare compared to self-pay or 
uninsured patients.  In order to be covered by Medicare Part B, patients must be over the 
age of 65 or disabled; these populations are large consumers of medical care.
In all specifications of the model reported in Table 26, the impact of an increase 
in the number of area physicians per capita is uniformly negative and highly significant.  
Areas with one percentage point more physicians per capita have 0.4643% to 0.4994% 
lower physician wages, on average.  This result is consistent with the basic economic 
theory of labor supply and demand.  A larger supply of physicians, ceteris paribus, should 
be associated with lower equilibrium wages. 
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10.3: OLS with Area Fixed-Effects and First-Difference Results
The following regression analyses employ the ordinary least squares method with 
area fixed effects and the first-differencing approach. Both of these methods control for 
unobserved area-specific factors that affect wages and isolate the change in wages due to 
changes in the immigrant share.  The coefficients in each of these regressions are 
interpreted as the marginal effect of a change in immigration on area wages.  Following 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) and Altonji and Card (1991), for both of these approaches 
the data are collapsed and analyzed at the area level.  The number of observations, 
therefore, drops from 161,811 physicians to 599 areas (comprised of MSAs and counties) 
for the OLS regressions with area fixed effects, and even further to 487 areas for the first-
difference analyses (areas which did not have physicians sampled in every year were 
dropped so as to create a balanced panel).  The dummy variable, male, is not lost in these 
regressions as when it is collapsed at the area level it is no longer a dummy variable and 
instead becomes the proportion of area physicians who are men in a given year.
It is important to note that the first-difference approach is more likely than the 
cross-sectional (OLS and 2SLS) approach to capture short-run effects of immigration, in 
which local labor markets have not had time to adjust.  Furthermore, “the relative 
magnitude of the short run and long run effects on wages depend on whether there are 
barriers to wage adjustments in the short run” (Altonji and Card 1991).  
The results of the OLS regressions with area fixed effects and the first-difference 
regressions are reported in Table 27. All coefficient estimates are reported with robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  For presentation purposes the independent variables are 
listed on the left, and it should be noted that in the case of the first-difference model they 
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are not in level form but instead represent the change in the variable from one time period 
to the next (for example, male in the first-?????????? ????? ?? ??????? ?male, but for ease 
of presentation is simply listed as male).
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Table 27
Fixed Effects and First-Difference Estimates of the Relationship between Immigration and Physician Wages
Dependent Variable: ln w ??? ?
Independent Variable
(3) OLS w/ Time and Area Fixed Effects
      (a)                       (b)                        (c)
(4) First-Difference
      (a)                       (b)                        (c)
I = Immigrant Share -0.0931 0.0058 0.1859 ** .0982
(.1111) (.1038) (.0749) (.0738)
FBFE_Share 0.0435 0.1776 *
(.1262) (.0930)
FBUSE_Share -0.1157 0.0181
(.1849) (.1677)
USBFE_Share -0.2701 -0.8188 **
(.2478) (.3920)
Male 0.0479 0.0757 0.0758 0.2057 ** 0.2226 ** 0.1859 *
(.1023) (.1052) (.1036) (.0950) (.0956) (.0992)
Age -0.0151 -0.0160 -0.0168 0.0700 *** 0.0220 0.0328
(.0230) (.0226) (.0227) (.0243) (.0203) (.0206)
Age2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0008 *** -0.0003 -0.0004 *
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0002) (.0002)
MedB 0.1521 0.3886 0.3856 0.8642 *** 0.3661 * 0.5601 ***
(.6359) (.6373) (.2475) (.2130) (.2106)
S = Physician Stock -0.2295 -0.2329 -0.5954 *** -0.6873 ***
(.1814) (.1832) (.1288) (.1461)
# of obs 599 533 533 487 398 398
R-Squared .8833 .8976 .8980 .1149 .0814 .1421
Adj. R-Squared .8511 .8662 .8661
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note: Parts (3)(b), (3)(c), (4)(b) and (4)(c) have fewer observations due to lack of data on the physician stock variable.
First-Difference Regressions represent a balanced panel and therefore have fewer observations than OLS Regressions.
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The first set of regression results presented in Table 27 are those of the fixed
effects estimation. The results of these regressions are somewhat unsatisfactory in that 
none of the individual regressors is statistically significant.  A loss of efficiency 
compared to other econometrical methods is generally associated with fixed effects 
estimation, and in this case the sample size compared to the previous OLS and 2SLS 
regressions has been greatly reduced.  So far all coefficient estimates, even those of the 
OLS and 2SLS models, have been relatively small.  Therefore, if there is even less 
variation of wages within areas than there is between areas it will be difficult to obtain 
statistically significant results.  Furthermore, any sampling or measurement error that 
exists in the calculation of the I, FBFE_Share, FBUSE_Share, and USBFE_Share 
variables, as well as the assignment of wages to physicians, is likely to be more 
problematic in the fixed effects model than in other models.  Aydemir and Borjas (2006) 
posit that it is precisely this measurement error that causes attenuation bias in studies of 
the impact of immigration on wages.  Specifically, they report that the “inclusion of these 
fixed effects implies that there is very little identifying variation left in the variable that 
captures the immigrant supply shift, permitting the sampling error in the immigrant share 
to play a disproportionately large role. As a result, even very small amounts of sampling 
error get magnified and easily dominate the remaining variation in the immigrant share.”
Indeed, the three fixed-effects specifications of the model (3)(a), (3)(b) and (3)(c) provide 
no evidence that changes in the share of immigrant physicians have any significant effect 
on average physician wages, once time-invariant area-specific factors that effect wages 
are accounted for. 
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The second set of results reported in Table 27 is those of the first-difference 
regressions.  Because unobservable factors that affect wages are likely to be correlated 
over time, serial correlation of the error term is likely to be present (this has been 
accounted for by using robust standard errors).  In the presence of serial correlation of the 
error term, the first-difference model is more efficient than the fixed effects model.  Thus, 
it is likely the better model for measuring the impact of immigration on wages within an
area in this case.  
The first specification which allows per capita physician supply to vary indicates 
that, in the short run, immigration of foreign physicians actually has a positive impact on 
average area wages.  Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the share of 
immigrant physicians in an area is associated with a 0.1859% increase in the average 
physician wage in the area.  This result can be explained as follows: as previously 
discussed, wages of physicians, like all wages, are likely to be “sticky”, and even more so 
than wages in other professions due to payment mechanisms involving third party payors.  
Suppose the supply of physicians in an area increases due to immigration.  To the extent 
that physicians are paid based on a fee-for-service mechanism, physician salaries will not 
be affected until third party payors such as Medicare or insurance companies realize that 
the physician supply has shifted and that they can lower reimbursement rates without 
jeopardizing their contracts with the providers.  In the meantime, if the immigrant 
physicians are not the lowest paid doctors in the area, there presence could actually 
increase the average physician wage in the area in the short run.  In the long run, wages 
will adjust to the supply shift as expected and be reduced.
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The results of part (4)(b) include the physician supply control and show that the 
short-run positive impacts of immigration on wages would be lower if supply were held 
constant, although this effect is not statistically significant.  There is thus some 
inconclusive evidence that, even in the short-run, the wage impacts of immigration are 
diluted by local physician labor movement.  The results of part (4)(c), which break down 
the impact of immigration by location of medical school, are in agreement with the 
results of (4)(a) and (4)(b).  The short-run impact of changes in the share of foreign-born 
immigrants in an area on average local wages is predicted to be positive, whether the 
immigrant physician was educated abroad or in the U.S.  The positive wage impact is 
stronger for the foreign-born and foreign-educated, and is statistically significant at the 
10% level, while the small positive effect of foreign-born, U.S.-educated physicians is 
not statistically significant.  Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the share of 
foreign-born, foreign-educated physicians in an area is expected to increase average 
physician wages in the area by 0.1776% in the short-run.  The result that foreign-born, 
foreign educated physicians have a larger positive impact on wages than their U.S.-
educated immigrant physician counterparts can be explained in the same way as the 
earlier 2SLS results where these physicians had a less negative long-run impact on wages 
than their U.S.-educated counterparts.
As was the case in all prior regressions, migration of U.S.-born physicians has the 
most negative effect on average area wages.  It seems that, whether in the short-run or 
long-run, these physicians are paid the lowest of any of the four categories of physicians.
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The signs and magnitudes of all of the other control variables included in the first-
difference regressions are as expected and consistent with the results of the OLS and 
2SLS regressions reported in Table 26.
10.4: Two-Stage Least Squares First Difference Results
The final specification of the model involves incorporating the instrumental 
variables described earlier to control for endogeneity that is not completely accounted for 
by the first-difference approach.  The results of this specification of the model are 
reported in Table 28.
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Table 28
2SLS First-Difference Estimates of the Relationship 
between Immigration and Physician Wages
Dependent Variable: Change in Natural Log of Physician Wages: ? lnw
Independent Variable (5)(a)                (5)(b)        (5)(c)? ? Immigration Share 0.1590 0.0653
(.1086) (.1134)? ??FE_Share 0.0751
(.1456)? ??????Share 0.3992
(.4028)? ???? 0.2593 *** 0.2406 ** 0.2410 **
(.0965) (.0999) (.0982)? ??? 0.0483 ** 0.0154 0.0154
(.0218) (.0192) (.0192)? ???2 -0.0006 ** -0.0002 -0.0002
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)? ???? 1.0149 *** 0.5438 *** 0.5259 *
(.2281) (.1790) (.3057)? ? -0.5500 *** -0.5517 ***
(.1192) (.1211)
First-Stage 
F-Test of Instrument 74.29 59.99
51.52
25.65
# of obs 482 395 395
R-Squared 0.1292 0.1107 0.1113
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note: All regressions have fewer observations than Part (4) above due to lack of data on the IV.
Part (5)(a) has more  observations than (5)(b) and (5)(c) due to lack of data on the S variable.
The results of the first-stage regression analyses indicate that the instruments are 
highly significant in predicting immigrant share after controlling for the other exogenous 
regressors.  The F-test of joint significance further indicates that the instruments are 
highly correlated with the measures of immigration employed in this analysis and thus 
meet the first criterion of an acceptable IV.  These first-stage results are reported in the 
appendix in Table A5.  Following Altonji and Card (1991) and Friedberg and Hunt 
(1995), the instruments are not likely to be correlated with future changes in wages. 
84
The estimated short-run marginal effects of changes in the share of immigrant 
physicians on average area wages, after controlling for endogenous location choice, are 
similar to the first-difference estimates without the instrumental variable but are smaller 
in magnitude.  This provides additional evidence that immigrant physicians do in fact 
choose to locate in areas with higher wages.  However, none of these estimates are 
statistically significant.  There is evidence that had the immigrant physician not chosen to 
move to the highest paying area, there would have been no significant short-run effect on 
wages at all.
10.5: Analyses with Specialty Controls
It is possible that the short-run positive and long-run negative effects of physician 
immigration could be attributable to specialty choice.  In particular, if foreign physicians 
are more prevalently represented in lower paying specialties, this would explain their 
long-run negative impact on average area wages.  The following analyses incorporate 
controls for specialty choice for each of the models previously presented.  The results of 
the OLS regressions with time fixed effects and the 2SLS regressions are presented in 
Table 29.  The base specialty category for comparison purposes is “Other Specialty” 
which, as defined in Chapter 8.2, is the average wage of all physicians in a given area.  
These results compare to those previously reported without specialty controls in Table 
26.
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Table 29
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Relationship between Immigration and Physician Wages with Specialty Controls
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Physician Wages: ln w
Independent Variable
(6) OLS w/ Time Fixed Effects
   (a)                       (b)                        (c)
(7) 2SLS w/ Time Fixed Effects
  (a)                    (b)                        (c)
I = Immigrant Share -0.0232 *** -0.0769 *** -0.1728 *** -0.1759 ***
(.0028) (.0041) (.0052) (.0054)
FBFE_Share 0.0517 *** -0.0557 ***
(.0054) (.0062)
FBUSE_Share -0.1811 *** -0.5319 ***
(.0133) (.0227)
USBFE_Share -1.230 ***
(.0250)
Male 0.0050 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0041 *** 0.0043 *** 0.0039 *** 0.0039 ***
(.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
Age 0.0008 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0003 0.0006 *** 0.0006 ***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Age2 -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 ** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 ***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
MedB 0.5083 *** 0.5256 *** 0.6933 *** 0.4051 *** 0.5419 *** 0.2964 ***
(.0101) (.0156) (.0174) (.0104) (.0139) (.0196)
S = Physician Stock -0.4569 *** -0.5062 *** -0.4722 *** -0.4784 ***
(.0080) (.0084) (.0081) (.0082)
Anesthesiology 0.0507 *** 0.0503 *** 0.0500 *** 0.0479 *** 0.0487 *** 0.0492 ***
(.0020) (.0022) (.0022) (.0019) (.0021) (.0021)
Family/General -0.0834 *** -0.0859 *** -0.0848 *** -0.0796 *** -0.0812 *** -0.0810 ***
(.0014) (.0016) (.0015) (.0012) (.0014) (.0014)
OBGYN 0.0760 *** 0.0738 *** 0.0751 *** 0.0775 *** 0.0760 *** 0.0760 ***
(.0017) (.0019) (.0017) (.0015) (.0016) (.0016)
Pediatrics -0.0792 *** -0.0852 *** 0.0824 *** -0.0761 *** -0.0826 *** -0.0828 ***
(.0017) (.0018) (.0017) (.0015) (.0016) (.0016)
Psychiatry -0.0814 *** -0.0860 *** -0.0847 *** -0.0820 *** -0.0879 *** -0.0874 ***
(.0019) (.0020) (.0020) (.0017) (.0019) (.0019)
Surgery 0.1148 *** 0.1135 *** 0.1120 *** 0.1116 *** 0.1119 *** 0.1123 ***
(.0010) (.0011) (.0010) (.0009) (.0009) (.0010)
Internal Medicine 0.0118 *** 0.0133 *** 0.0144 *** 0.0141 *** 0.0140 *** 0.0138 ***
(.0013) (.0013) (.0013) (.0011) (.0012) (.0012)
First-Stage 
F-Test of Instrument 68,151 95,898
29,240
23,472
# of obs 161,811 129,375 129,375 159,448 128,074 128,074
R-Squared 0.5726 0.5875 0.6268 0.6311 0.6373 0.6365
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note  Parts (6)(b), (6)(c),  (7)(b) and (7)(c) have fewer observations due to lack of data on the physician stock variable.
Part (7) has fewer observations than Part (6) due to lack of data on the instrumental variable.
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The results reported in Table 29 as to the impact of physician immigration on 
local wages are almost identical to those reported earlier in Table 26 without the specialty 
controls.  The small negative impacts of immigration on local wages remain highly 
significant even when specialty is controlled for.  Thus, the negative impact of an 
increase in the share of immigrant physicians on local area wages cannot be attributed to 
specialty choice.  These results provide evidence that immigration of physicians lowers 
the average physician wage in an area, most likely because they are willing to accept a 
lower wage than physicians already practicing in the area.  Specifically, the OLS results 
in part (6)(a) average wage of physicians in areas with a one percentage point larger share 
of immigrant physicians is expected to be 0.0232% lower on average, and this lower 
wage is not attributable to foreign physicians specializing in lower paying fields.  This 
effect is significant at the 1% level.
Because the effect becomes even more negative when physician supply is held 
constant, one can further infer that foreign-born physicians must be paid less, on average, 
than native-born physicians.  If the immigrant share increases but per capita physician 
supply is held constant, the share of native-born physicians in an area must decrease.  The 
larger negative coefficients in both specifications of the 2SLS model, (7)(a) and (7)(b), 
continue to provide evidence that although foreign-born physicians are willing to accept 
less than the average area wage, they are still not the lowest paid of all physicians in the 
area, on average.  The 2SLS results suggest that the negative impacts of immigration 
would have been even larger, on the level of about 0.17% for a one percentage point 
increase in immigrant share, if the lowest paid physicians in the area had not responded to 
the influx of immigration by moving away.  There is evidence provided throughout this 
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study that the lowest paid of all physicians are the U.S.-born, foreign-educated.  The 
results of the 2SLS regressions also continue to provide evidence that foreign-born 
physicians are drawn to areas where wages are already higher, on average.
The regression results controlling for location of education in parts (6)(c) and 
(7)(c) are also consistent with those reported in Table 26.  Even after controlling for 
specialty, the impact of immigration of foreign-born, foreign-educated physicians 
initially appears positive, but, after controlling for endogenous location choice, is small 
and negative but highly significant.  The effects of immigration of foreign-born, U.S.-
educated physicians remain more negative than the effects of the foreign-born, foreign-
educated physicians and the magnitudes of the coefficients are similar to those reported 
without specialty controls.  The negative effects of immigration, and the larger negative 
effects of an increase in the share of foreign-born, U.S.-educated physicians in an area, 
are therefore not attributable to specialty choice.  
After adding controls for specialty, the positive coefficients on the male dummy 
variable, although small to begin with, become even smaller in magnitude, and remain 
highly significant.  Once specialty choice is controlled for, men earn about 0.4% higher 
wages than women, on average, as compared to about 3.0% higher wages reported in 
Table 26 without specialty controls.  Thus, much of the wage inequality between men and 
women can be attributed to the fact that women are more likely to specialize in lower 
paying fields. 
The results of the OLS regressions with area fixed effects and the first-difference 
analyses, with specialty controls included, are reported in Table 30.  
88
Table 30
Fixed Effects and First-Difference Estimates of the Relationship between Immigration and Physician Wages with Specialty Controls
Dependent Variable:                                                 ln w                                     ??? ?
Independent Variable
(8) OLS w/ Time and Area Fixed Effects
   (a)                   (b)                        (c)
(9) First-Difference
   (a)                   (b)                 (c)
I = Immigrant Share -0.0758 0 0419 0.1279 * 0.0583
(.1140) (.1034) (.0687) (.0700)
FBFE_Share 0.1004 0.1308
(.1245) (.0921)
FBUSE_Share -0.1100 -0.0007
(.1824) (.1641)
USBFE_Share -0.1913 -0.7953 **
(.2527) (.3796)
Male 0.0154 0 0819 0.0870 -0.0045 0.0970 0.1118
(.1089) (.1129) (.1115) (.1122) (.1137) (.1039)
Age -0.0120 -0.0152 -0.0170 0.0682 *** 0.0152 0.227
(.0237) (.0223) (.0224) (.0243) (.0222) (.0221)
Age2 0.0001 0 0001 0.0001 -0.0008 *** -0.0002 -0.0003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
MedB 0.2036 0 3999 0.3979 0.7608 *** 0.3071 0.5081 ***
(.6482) (.6323) (.6358) (.2259) (.2112) (.1969)
S = Physician Stock -0.2403 -0.2424 -0.6512 *** -0.7423
(.1789) (.1810) (.1251) (.1413)
Anesthesiology -0.0911 -0.1289 -0.1230 0.1281 0.0493 0.0282
(.1900) (.1780) (.1777) (.2042) (.1974) (.2066)
Family/General -0.0996 -0.1078 -0.0971 -0.1271 -0.0622 -0.0859
(.1680) (.1429) (.1436) (.1226) (.1159) (.1158)
OBGYN 0.1863 0.2557 0.2620 0.0036 0.3091 0.4060 **
(.1947) (.1911) (.1912) (.2126) (.2146) (.1973)
Pediatrics -0.1284 -0.0226 -0.0157 -0.4201 ** -0.0765 0.0334
(.1653) (.1651) (.1638) (.1971) (.1729) (.1593)
Psychiatry -0.3023 -0.1087 -0.1009 -0.7930 *** -0.6100 ** -0.5408 ***
(.1984) (.2107) (.2119) (.2523) (.2414) (.2092)
Surgery 0.1167 0.2595 0.2622 ** 0.2315 0.2631 0.1947
(.1321) (.1219) (.1232) (.1480) (.1405) (.1324)
Internal Medicine -0.1412 -0.1102 -0.1131 -0.0010 0.0546 0.0859
(.1656) (.1768) (.1760) (.1830) (.1645) (.1610)
# of obs 599 533 533 487 398 398
R-Squared 0.8850 0.9004 0.9007 0.1667 0.1288 0.1831
Adj. R-Squared 0.8512 .08675 0.8673
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note  Parts (8)(b), (8)(c), (9)(b) and (9)(c) have fewer observations due to lack of data on the physician stock variable.
First-Difference Regressions represent a balanced panel and therefore have fewer observations than OLS Regressions.
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With regard to both the fixed effects and first-difference regressions, it is 
important to note that, as before with the male dummy variable, collapsing the data at the 
area and year level transforms the dummy variables for each specialty code into the 
proportion of area physicians in each year that specialize in the given field.  Therefore, 
these variables are not dropped from the regression analyses.  The results of the 
regressions with area fixed effects are problematic, as before.  The probable explanation 
for the insignificant results and attenuation bias is discussed in Chapter 10.3.
The signs of the coefficients on the immigrant share variables in the first-
difference analyses (9)(a) and (9)(b) are the same as in the first-difference regressions 
(4)(a) and (4)(b) without specialty controls, but the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
smaller.  This suggests that some of the short-run positive effects on average area wages 
resulting from a change in the immigrant physician share within an area can be explained 
by specialty: the foreign-born physicians moving into the area tend to specialize in higher 
paying fields.  However, the positive effect without controlling for physician supply is 
still significant at the 10% level: a one percentage point increase in the share of 
immigrant physicians in an area is associated with a 0.1279% increase in average 
physician wages in that area, even after controlling for the effect of physician specialty.  
The effect becomes even smaller and insignificant one changes in physician supply are 
controlled for, evidence that, even in the short-run, some of the lowest paid physicians 
may be leaving the area in response to the immigrant inflow.  
After controlling for both physician specialty and foreign medical education, the 
only group of physicians whose migration has a significant impact on area wages in the 
short-run is the U.S.-born, foreign-educated group.  A one percentage point increase in 
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the share of area physicians who are U.S.-born and educated abroad is predicted to reduce 
the average area wage by 0.7953%.  This result is significant at the 5% level and the 
magnitude is similar to the first-difference result without specialty controls.  Thus, one
may conclude that this group of physicians tends to be paid the least, regardless of their 
specialty.  
The results of the first-difference regressions including specialty controls and the 
instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity problems are reported in 
Table 31. The results of the first-stage regressions are reported in the appendix in Table 
A7.  Consistent with earlier results, even after including specialty controls the 
instruments are highly significant in predicting changes in the immigrant stock.  
91
Table 31
2SLS First-Difference Estimates of the Relationship 
between Immigration and Physician Wages with Specialty Controls
Dependent Variable: Change in Natural Log of Physician Wages: ? ??w
Independent Variable (10)(a)                  (10)(b)             (10)(c)? ? ??????????? ????? 0.1673 0.0793
(.1134) (.1150)? ?????????? 0.1024
(.1510)? ??????????? 0.0201
(.4073)? ???? 0.1114 0.1807 * 0.1818
(.1049) (.1062) (.1047)? ??? 0.0450 ** 0.0053 0.0053
(.0220) (.0205) (.0205)? ???2 -0.0005 ** -0.0001 -0.0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)? ???? 0.9718 *** 0.5205 *** 0.4789
(.1987) (.1670) (.2944)? ? -0.5946 *** -0.5978
(.1181) (.1197)? ?????????????? 0.0202 -0.0250 -0.0231
(.1932) (.1893) (.1903)? ?????????????? -0.0272 0.0225 0.0246
(.1106) (.0982) (.0998)? ????? 0.1835 0.4746 *** 0.4759
(.1825) (.1726) (.1727)? ?????????? -0.3098 * 0.0240 0.0201
(.1837) (.1536) (.1533)? ?????????? -0.6129 *** -0.4015 ** -0.3921
(.2212) (.1953) (.1982)? ??????? 0.1077 0.1637 0.1666
(.1307) (.1217) (.1222)? ???????? ???????? -0.1180 -0.0252 -0.0254
(.1730) (.1487) (.1489)
First-Stage 
F-Test of Instrument 65.31 56.67
50.58
26.99
# of obs 482 395 395
R-Squared 0.1670 0.1529 0.1535
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note: All regressions have fewer observations than Part (9) above due to lack of data on the IV.
Part (10)(a) has more  observations than (10)(b) and (10)(c) due to lack of data on the S variable.
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The results of the 2SLS first-difference analyses with specialty controls are 
similar to those without specialty controls reported earlier in Table 28.  None of the 
estimates of the impact of changes in immigration on changes in average area wages are 
statistically significant.  The positive effect of immigration that remained even in the 
presence of the specialty controls becomes insignificant once the instrument is included 
to control for endogenous location choice.  These results provide further evidence that 
had the immigrant physician not chosen to move to the highest paying area, there would 
have been no significant short-run effect on wages at all.
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11: Conclusions of Study based on Regression Analyses
This study of immigrant and native physicians has been able to provide evidence 
that, in the short-run, the wage impacts of physician immigration tend to be positive, 
because physician wages are sticky, because immigrants tend not to be the lowest paid 
physicians in an area and because they tend to settle in areas where wages are higher, on 
average.  The short-run positive effects of immigration on wages are somewhat, but not 
completely, explained by specialty choice, with immigrant physicians tending to 
specialize in somewhat higher paying fields.  
In the long run, however, immigration tends to have a negative impact on area 
wages.  This study has been able to provide evidence that immigrant physicians are 
drawn to areas where wages tend to be higher.  There is also evidence that the negative 
effect of immigration on wages is mitigated by outward migration of lower paid local 
physicians in response to the lower wages caused by the influx of foreign physicians.  
The long-run negative effects of immigration are not explained by specialty choice.  
Therefore, immigrants seem to be willing to accept a lower than average wage.  The 
negative effect of immigration on average wages tends to be relatively small, with a one 
percentage point increase in the share of foreign-born physicians having a less than 0.2% 
effect on average area wages by all measures.  
In addition, analyzing the wage impacts of physician immigration reveals that 
foreign-educated immigrant physicians tend to have a more positive short-run effect on 
wages and a less negative long-run effect on wages, while the opposite is true for foreign-
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born, U.S.-educated physicians.  Because foreign-born, U.S.-educated immigrants are 
more likely to have lived in the United States longer and less likely to have to overcome 
difficult immigration hurdles, such as visa requirements and migration costs associated 
with moving an already established family to a new country, likely at an older age, they 
are less likely to be favorably selected.  
Simply analyzing the data in terms of descriptive statistics also reveals that 
immigrant physicians are more likely than their native counterparts to work in larger 
cities as opposed to rural areas.  Younger doctors are even more likely to live in larger 
MSAs, while older physicians are more likely than younger physicians to practice in rural 
areas.  
The results of all regression analyses performed in this study show that male 
physicians are likely to earn more than female physicians, although the difference 
becomes minimal after controlling for specialty choice.  The number of women entering 
the medical profession has been increasing every year.  The regressions also show that 
physician wages increase with age but at a decreasing rate, in agreement with labor 
economic theory.
The analysis consistently predicts that physicians who practice in areas where a 
larger percentage of patients are covered by Medicare Part B are likely to earn higher 
wages.  This is likely due to area-specific factors such as age of population and disability 
status that are likely to increase demand.  This result could also be explained by a higher 
probability that physicians will actually be paid when patients are covered by Medicare 
compared with self-pay and uninsured patients.
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The conclusions about the impact of immigration on wages drawn from this study 
are consistent with many of the earlier studies on the topic.  In fact, the majority of 
research in this area has concluded that immigration tends to have a very small negative 
effect on wages.  Even studies that specifically address the issue of high-skilled 
immigration have, in general, found a negative impact of immigration on wages.  Borjas 
(2003) concluded that immigration has a negative effect on wages of college graduates.  
Borjas (2005) and Borjas (2006) found a small negative impact of immigration of foreign 
students on earnings of doctorates in the science and engineering fields; the magnitude of 
the impact found in his studies is somewhat larger than that found in this analysis.
Earlier studies have also found evidence of outward migration of natives in 
response to immigration. Specifically, Butcher and Card (1991) concluded that the 
potential impacts of immigration are diminished due to outflow migration of natives, 
while Frey (1994) found that during the 1980s, large numbers of native whites moved 
away from immigrant-heavy destinations such as Los Angeles and New York.
The results of the first-difference approach are qualitatively in agreement with 
those of Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1996), who found a small positive (almost zero) 
impact of changes in immigration on wages at the MSA level.  
Card (2001) employed an instrumental variable approach similar to that used in 
this study and found a systematically negative impact of immigration on wages.  His 
study, however, focused primarily on low-skilled workers.  As is the case in this study, 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) found a systematically more negative effect of immigration 
on wages when employing the two-stage least squares method as opposed to the ordinary 
least squares analysis.
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Chapter 12: Healthcare and Immigration Policy Implications
The results of this analysis have different policy implications depending on the 
goals of policy makers.  If the goal of policy makers is to address an alleged shortage of 
physicians, this can be achieved by either increasing the number of U.S. medical school 
graduates by subsidizing the cost of constructing new medical school as well as the cost 
of attendance for prospective students or by encouraging immigration of foreign-born 
physicians through less restrictive visa requirements and supporting programs that make 
the immigration process easier for foreign-born physicians by reducing costs and easing 
the adjustment process.  This study has shown that immigrant physicians tend to lower 
the average wage of physicians; this may or may not be in agreement with policymakers’
objectives.  To the extent that lower physician wages trickle-down to consumers in the 
form of lower charges for physician services, this could be beneficial to society.  
However, native physicians will likely suffer a reduction in their wage in the long run due 
not only to the increase in supply caused by immigration but because the immigrants are 
willing to work for lower wages, on average, than their native-born counterparts.  The 
results of this study reveal that the negative impacts of immigration are actually largest 
for foreign-born, U.S.-educated physicians.  Therefore, if reducing physician wages, and 
potentially the cost of physician care, is the goal of policymakers then this is more likely 
to be accomplished by implementing programs that encourage foreign-born students to 
attend U.S. medical schools.  However, if the goal is to increase the supply of physicians 
while maintaining the current physician wages, it would be advisable to instead 
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encourage immigration of foreign-physicians who already have their degrees by relaxing 
current visa restrictions.
If the goal of policy makers is specifically to increase the supply of primary care 
physicians, this study has shown that foreign-educated physicians and women are more 
likely to specialize in general practice than native-born male physicians.  Thus, policy 
makers may wish to implement programs to encourage U.S. women to enter the medical 
profession and/or make it easier for foreign medical graduates to practice in the U.S.  As 
previously discussed, the impact of immigration of foreign medical graduates, whether 
born in the U.S. or a foreign country, on local area wages is negative; again, this may or 
may not be in agreement with policy makers objectives.  In addition to the potential 
reduction in the cost of physician services, a negative wage impact, theoretically, causes 
an immigration surplus by increasing area employment.  
As to increasing the number of physicians, whether primary care or specialist, in 
the Health Professional Shortage Areas and Medically Underserved Areas, there is not 
enough evidence at this point to say whether this can be achieved through immigration; 
more information is needed for further study.  This study has shown that immigrant 
physicians are less likely than native physicians to work in rural areas, which are 
traditionally thought of as being medically underserved.  However, there are many areas 
in MSAs, for example inner city neighborhoods, that are actually classified as HPSAs 
and MUAs.  Immigrants tend to locate in areas where wages are higher, on average.  It 
seems reasonable to assume that wages in HPSAs and MUAs are lower than in more 
desirable locales.  However, the study is unable to determine whether wages are higher or 
lower, on average, in these areas or whether immigrant physicians who practice in large 
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MSAs are practicing in the Health Professional Shortage Areas or Medically 
Underserved Areas.  The AMA Physician Masterfile contains data on physician city, 
county, state, and even zip code.  The Health Professional Shortage Areas and Medically 
Underserved Areas, however, are defined by census tract.  There is no readily available 
database, to this researcher’s knowledge, that allows census tracts to be cross-referenced 
with zip code such that physicians who are practicing in an underserved area can be 
identified.  This task could likely be accomplished using geocoding data that maps zip 
codes and census tracts.  Such a study would prove extremely useful and is an important 
area for future research.
Finally, it is important to note that the wage impacts of any of any policy that 
affects the supply of physicians through immigration will not immediately take effect.  
The results of the first-difference analyses show that an increase in immigration of 
foreign physicians is likely to have a small positive impact on average physician wages in 
the short-run; however, as wages adjust to the supply shock over time, the effect on 
wages becomes negative.
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Table A1
Physicians by Country of Birth
BIRTH COUNTRY FREQUENCY
% OF FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
UNITED STATES 126,355
INDIA 8,352 18.8%
PHILIPPINES 3,905 8.8%
CANADA 2,105 4.7%
SOUTH KOREA 1,703 3.8%
PAKISTAN 1,523 3.4%
IRAN 1,486 3.3%
CHINA 1,343 3.0%
CUBA 1,252 2.8%
GERMANY 1,139 2.6%
UNITED KINGDOM 1,123 2.5%
VIETNAM 999 2.2%
TAIWAN 908 2.0%
EGYPT 823 1.8%
MEXICO 639 1.4%
SYRIA 601 1.4%
POLAND 593 1.3%
COLOMBIA 537 1.2%
ISRAEL 516 1.2%
ARGENTINA 484 1.1%
NIGERIA 473 1.1%
HONG KONG 471 1.1%
JAPAN 459 1.0%
SOUTH AFRICA 449 1.0%
ROMANIA 438 1.0%
ITALY 430 1.0%
LEBANON 416 0.9%
PERU 403 0.9%
JAMAICA 376 0.8%
HAITI 373 0.8%
THAILAND 360 0.8%
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 354 0.8%
RUSSIA 329 0.7%
GREECE 323 0.7%
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Table A1 (Continued)
Physicians by Country of Birth
BIRTH COUNTRY FREQUENCY
% OF FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
SPAIN 293 0.7%
UKRAINE 285 0.6%
TURKEY 281 0.6%
IRELAND 278 0.6%
HUNGARY 254 0.6%
BRAZIL 241 0.5%
BURMA 232 0.5%
FRANCE 232 0.5%
SRI LANKA 214 0.5%
USSR 204 0.5%
LATVIA 202 0.5%
BANGLADESH 192 0.4%
JORDAN 191 0.4%
IRAQ 182 0.4%
AUSTRALIA 180 0.4%
VENEZUELA 164 0.4%
GHANA 163 0.4%
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 160 0.4%
CZECH REPUBLIC 156 0.4%
KENYA 154 0.3%
PANAMA 147 0.3%
NETHERLANDS 146 0.3%
GUYANA 143 0.3%
CHILE 142 0.3%
AUSTRIA 137 0.3%
ETHIOPIA 133 0.3%
MALAYSIA 131 0.3%
ECUADOR 119 0.3%
SWITZERLAND 119 0.3%
INDONESIA 117 0.3%
NICARAGUA 114 0.3%
BOLIVIA 109 0.2%
GUATEMALA 103 0.2%
SWEDEN 100 0.2%
BELGIUM 99 0.2%
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Table A1 (Continued)
Physicians by Country of Birth
BIRTH COUNTRY FREQUENCY
% OF FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
BULGARIA 90 0.2%
EL SALVADOR 83 0.2%
UGANDA 82 0.2%
SINGAPORE 79 0.2%
TANZANIA 75 0.2%
AFGHANISTAN 65 0.1%
NEW ZEALAND 63 0.1%
YUGOSLAVIA 61 0.1%
SERBIA 60 0.1%
CROATIA 57 0.1%
HONDURAS 51 0.1%
DENMARK 50 0.1%
PORTUGAL 49 0.1%
LITHUANIA 48 0.1%
COSTA RICA 47 0.1%
BARBADOS 44 0.1%
BELARUS 43 0.1%
URUGUAY 42 0.1%
PARAGUAY 41 0.1%
KUWAIT 39 0.1%
UZBEKISTAN 38 0.1%
NORWAY 36 0.1%
SAUDI ARABIA 36 0.1%
ZIMBABWE 36 0.1%
CYPRUS 35 0.1%
FINLAND 35 0.1%
ZAMBIA 34 0.1%
MOROCCO 33 0.1%
CAMBODIA 31 0.1%
BAHAMAS 30 0.1%
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 30 0.1%
NEPAL 30 0.1%
ARMENIA 28 0.1%
SUDAN 27 0.1%
CZECHOSKLOVAKIA 25 0.1%
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Table A1 (Continued)
Physicians by Country of Birth
BIRTH COUNTRY FREQUENCY
% OF FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
GRENADA 25 0.1%
ICELAND 25 0.1%
CAMEROON 24 0.1%
LIBYA 24 0.1%
COLUMBIA 23 0.1%
LIBERIA 22 0.0%
MOLDOVA 22 0.0%
TUNISIA 20 0.0%
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 19 0.0%
GUAM 19 0.0%
AZERBAIJAN 18 0.0%
BERMUDA 18 0.0%
SLOVAKIA 18 0.0%
ESTONIA 17 0.0%
ZAIRE 17 0.0%
ALGERIA 16 0.0%
FIJI 15 0.0%
GEORGIA 15 0.0%
LAOS 15 0.0%
SIERRA LEONE 15 0.0%
MACEDONIA 14 0.0%
ST KITT 14 0.0%
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 13 0.0%
MALAWI 12 0.0%
ALBANIA 11 0.0%
BELIZE 11 0.0%
MALTA 11 0.0%
YUGO 11 0.0%
ARUBA 10 0.0%
MAURITIUS 9 0.0%
SLOVENIA 9 0.0%
SOMALIA 9 0.0%
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 9 0.0%
BAHRAIN 8 0.0%
ST LUCIA 8 0.0%
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Table A1 (Continued)
Physicians by Country of Birth
BIRTH COUNTRY FREQUENCY
% OF FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
SURINAME 8 0.0%
BRUNEI 7 0.0%
KAZAKHSTAN 7 0.0%
KYRGYZSTAN 6 0.0%
NORTH KOREA 6 0.0%
MOZAMBIQUE 5 0.0%
VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 5 0.0%
CAPE VERDE 4 0.0%
CONGO 4 0.0%
MACAU 4 0.0%
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 4 0.0%
NIGER 4 0.0%
RWANDA 4 0.0%
INDIES 3 0.0%
LUXEMBOURG 3 0.0%
MARSHALL ISLANDS 3 0.0%
QATAR 3 0.0%
SENEGAL 3 0.0%
YEMEN 3 0.0%
ANGOLA 2 0.0%
BURKINA FASO 2 0.0%
GUINEA 2 0.0%
MONTSERRAT 2 0.0%
OMAN 2 0.0%
REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI 2 0.0%
SAMOA 2 0.0%
ZANZIBAR 2 0.0%
ANGUILLA 1 0.0%
BOTSWANA 1 0.0%
COTE D'IVOIRE 1 0.0%
DJIBOUTI 1 0.0%
EAST TIMOR 1 0.0%
GABON 1 0.0%
LESOTHO 1 0.0%
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Table A1 (Continued)
Physicians by Country of Birth
BIRTH COUNTRY FREQUENCY
% OF FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
MADAGASCAR 1 0.0%
MALDIVES 1 0.0%
MONTENEGRO 1 0.0%
NAMIBIA 1 0.0%
PALAU 1 0.0%
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1 0.0%
REUNION 1 0.0%
SWAZILAND 1 0.0%
TAJIKISTAN 1 0.0%
TOGO 1 0.0%
TONGA 1 0.0%
TURKS AND CAICOS 1 0.0%
OTHER FOREIGN 381 0.8%
TOTAL 170,858
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Table A2
Foreign-Born Physicians by MSA
MSA DESCRIPTION
# OF    
FOREIGN-
BORN 
PHYSICIANS
% OF TOTAL 
FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
New York, NY 3,669 8.2%
Los Angeles/Long Beach, CA 2,380 5.3%
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL Metropolitan Division 2,139 4.8%
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA NECTA Division 1,317 3.0%
Washington, DC--MD--VA MSA 1,315 3.0%
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI Metropolitan Division 1,064 2.4%
Nassau-Suffolk, NY MSA 1,056 2.4%
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 1,047 2.4%
Miami, FL 985 2.2%
Houston, TX 941 2.1%
Orange County, CA 777 1.7%
Baltimore, MD MSA 679 1.5%
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 641 1.4%
Newark, NJ 512 1.2%
St. Louis, MO--IL MSA 511 1.1%
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA 506 1.1%
Bergen-Passaic, NJ MSA 505 1.1%
Atlanta, GA MSA 504 1.1%
San Francisco, CA PMSA 490 1.1%
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX Metropolitan Division 483 1.1%
Pittsburgh, PA MSA 480 1.1%
San Jose, CA PMSA 465 1.0%
Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearwater, FL MSA 441 1.0%
San Diego, CA MSA 404 0.9%
Phoenix, AZ MSA 401 0.9%
Oakland, CA PMSA 398 0.9%
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA 367 0.8%
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ MSA 344 0.8%
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL 336 0.8%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 278 0.6%
Orlando, FL MSA 274 0.6%
Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN—WI MSA 273 0.6%
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 260 0.6%
Milwaukee/Waukesha, WI 256 0.6%
Sacramento, CA MSA 252 0.6%
Hartford, CT 251 0.6%
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ MSA 248 0.6%
Jacksonville, FL MSA 237 0.5%
San Antonio, TX MSA 235 0.5%
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 226 0.5%
New Orleans, LA MSA 225 0.5%
Las Vegas, NV MSA 217 0.5%
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Table A2 (Continued)
Foreign-Born Physicians by MSA
MSA DESCRIPTION
# OF    
FOREIGN-
BORN 
PHYSICIANS
% OF TOTAL 
FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
Indianapolis, IN MSA 216 0.5%
West Palm Beach--Boca Raton--Delray Beach, FL MSA 213 0.5%
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA 211 0.5%
Norfolk--Virginia Beach--Newport News, VA MSA 199 0.4%
Columbus, OH MSA 185 0.4%
Rochester, NY MSA 182 0.4%
San Juan-Bayamon, PR MSA 179 0.4%
Ann Arbor, MI 178 0.4%
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA MSA 177 0.4%
Kansas City, MO--KS MSA 174 0.4%
Denver-Aurora, CO 172 0.4%
Bridgeport, CT 171 0.4%
New Haven--Meriden, CT MSA 171 0.4%
Dayton--Springfield, OH MSA 169 0.4%
Richmond--Petersburg, VA MSA 167 0.4%
Honolulu, HI MSA 166 0.4%
Rochester, MN 166 0.4%
Nashville, TN MSA 162 0.4%
Louisville, KY--IN MSA 157 0.4%
Albany--Schenectady--Troy, NY MSA 155 0.3%
Syracuse, NY MSA 152 0.3%
Fresno, CA MSA 147 0.3%
Jersey City, NJ MSA 143 0.3%
Oklahoma City, OK MSA 143 0.3%
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Metropolitan Division 135 0.3%
Memphis, TN--AR--MS MSA 135 0.3%
Birmingham, AL MSA 134 0.3%
Gary, IN 122 0.3%
Tucson, AZ MSA 122 0.3%
Austin, TX MSA 115 0.3%
Toledo, OH MSA 111 0.2%
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 105 0.2%
Trenton, NJ MSA 104 0.2%
Youngstown--Warren, OH MSA 104 0.2%
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill, NC--SC MSA 102 0.2%
Flint, MI MSA 99 0.2%
Bakersfield, CA MSA 97 0.2%
Albuquerque, NM MSA 95 0.2%
Harrisburg--Lebanon--Carlisle, PA MSA 93 0.2%
Akron, OH 90 0.2%
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT MSA 88 0.2%
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA 85 0.2%
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Table A2 (Continued)
Foreign-Born Physicians by MSA
MSA DESCRIPTION
# OF    
FOREIGN-
BORN 
PHYSICIANS
% OF TOTAL 
FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
Lexington-Fayette, KY MSA 85 0.2%
El Paso, TX MSA 84 0.2%
Sarasota, FL MSA 84 0.2%
Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton, PA--NJ MSA 83 0.2%
Mcallen--Edinburg--Mission, TX MSA 82 0.2%
Omaha, NE--IA MSA 81 0.2%
Ventura, CA MSA 81 0.2%
Iowa City, IA MSA 80 0.2%
Gainesville, FL MSA 79 0.2%
Galveston/Texas City, TX 78 0.2%
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA MSA 75 0.2%
Worcester, MA MSA 75 0.2%
Tacoma, WA PMSA 73 0.2%
Little Rock--North Little Rock, AR MSA 71 0.2%
Newburgh, NY/PA 71 0.2%
Dutchess County, NY MSA 69 0.2%
Grand Rapids, MI MSA 68 0.2%
Stockton, CA MSA 68 0.2%
Augusta, GA--SC MSA 67 0.2%
Lansing--East Lansing, MI MSA 67 0.2%
Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay, FL MSA 67 0.2%
Saginaw--Bay City--Midland, MI MSA 66 0.1%
Shreveport, LA MSA 65 0.1%
Charlottesville, VA MSA 64 0.1%
Corpus Christi, TX MSA 64 0.1%
Charleston, SC MSA 63 0.1%
Daytona Beach, FL MSA 63 0.1%
Madison, WI MSA 63 0.1%
Tulsa, OK MSA 61 0.1%
Wichita, KS MSA 60 0.1%
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA MSA 59 0.1%
Beaumont--Port Arthur, TX MSA 58 0.1%
Columbia, MO MSA 58 0.1%
Lakeland--Winter Haven, FL MSA 57 0.1%
Binghamton, NY MSA 56 0.1%
Jackson, MS MSA 56 0.1%
Fort Myers--Cape Coral, FL MSA 52 0.1%
Lubbock, TX MSA 52 0.1%
Santa Barbara--Santa Maria--Lompoc, CA MSA 52 0.1%
Springfield, IL MSA 52 0.1%
Atlantic City, NJ MSA 51 0.1%
Canton, OH MSA 50 0.1%
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Table A2 (Continued)
Foreign-Born Physicians by MSA
MSA DESCRIPTION
# OF    
FOREIGN-
BORN 
PHYSICIANS
% OF TOTAL 
FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
Charleston, WV MSA 50 0.1%
Utica--Rome, NY MSA 49 0.1%
Knoxville, TN MSA 48 0.1%
Peoria, IL MSA 48 0.1%
Modesto, CA MSA 47 0.1%
Tallahassee, FL MSA 47 0.1%
Kalamazoo, MI MSA 46 0.1%
Greenville--Spartanburg, SC MSA 45 0.1%
Huntington--Ashland, WV--KY--OH MSA 45 0.1%
Columbia, SC MSA 44 0.1%
Johnson City--Kingsport--Bristol, TN--VA MSA 44 0.1%
Punta Gorda, FL MSA 44 0.1%
Mobile, AL MSA 43 0.1%
Naples, FL MSA 42 0.1%
Odessa, TX 42 0.1%
Brownsville--Harlingen, TX MSA 41 0.1%
Champaign-Urbana, IL 41 0.1%
Fayetteville, NC MSA 41 0.1%
Baton Rouge, LA MSA 40 0.1%
Chattanooga, TN--GA MSA 40 0.1%
Evansville, IN--KY MSA 39 0.1%
Fort Pierce, FL MSA 39 0.1%
Fort Wayne, IN MSA 39 0.1%
Greenville, NC MSA 38 0.1%
Rockford, IL MSA 38 0.1%
Macon--Warner Robins, GA MSA 37 0.1%
Santa Rosa, CA MSA 37 0.1%
Erie, PA MSA 36 0.1%
Brazoria, TX MSA 35 0.1%
Davenport--Rock Island--Moline, IA--IL MSA 35 0.1%
Lowell, MA-NH MSA 35 0.1%
Reading, PA MSA 35 0.1%
Ocala, FL MSA 34 0.1%
Spokane, WA MSA 34 0.1%
Killeen--Temple, TX MSA 33 0.1%
Pensacola, FL MSA 33 0.1%
Johnstown, PA 32 0.1%
Portland, ME MSA 32 0.1%
Amarillo, TX MSA 31 0.1%
Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah, WI MSA 31 0.1%
Des Moines, IA MSA 31 0.1%
Montgomery, AL MSA 31 0.1%
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Foreign-Born Physicians by MSA
MSA DESCRIPTION
# OF    
FOREIGN-
BORN 
PHYSICIANS
% OF TOTAL 
FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
Roanoke, VA MSA 31 0.1%
Stamford-Norwalk, CT MSA 31 0.1%
Visalia--Tulare--Porterville, CA MSA 31 0.1%
South Bend--Mishawaka, IN MSA 30 0.1%
Columbus, GA--AL MSA 29 0.1%
Wheeling, WV--OH MSA 29 0.1%
Reno, NV MSA 28 0.1%
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA MSA 28 0.1%
Savannah, GA MSA 28 0.1%
Yolo, CA MSA 28 0.1%
Huntsville, AL MSA 27 0.1%
Burlington, VT MSA 26 0.1%
Monroe, LA MSA 26 0.1%
Ponce, PR MSA 25 0.1%
Salinas--Seaside--Monterey, CA MSA 24 0.1%
Topeka, KS MSA 24 0.1%
Tyler, TX MSA 24 0.1%
Wichita Falls, TX MSA 24 0.1%
York, PA MSA 24 0.1%
Alexandria, LA MSA 22 0.0%
Altoona, PA MSA 22 0.0%
Chico, CA MSA 22 0.0%
Springfield, MO MSA 22 0.0%
Springfield, MA MSA 22 0.0%
Terre Haute, IN MSA 22 0.0%
Bangor, ME MSA 21 0.0%
Clarksville--Hopkinsville, TN--KY MSA 21 0.0%
Hagerstown, MD MSA 21 0.0%
Lancaster, PA MSA 21 0.0%
Olympia, WA MSA 21 0.0%
Fargo--Moorhead, ND--MN MSA 20 0.0%
Lafayette, LA MSA 20 0.0%
Lima, OH MSA 20 0.0%
Mayaguez, PR 20 0.0%
Merced, CA MSA 20 0.0%
Wilmington, NC MSA 20 0.0%
Colorado Springs, CO MSA 19 0.0%
Laredo, TX MSA 19 0.0%
Mansfield, OH MSA 19 0.0%
Parkersburg--Marietta, WV--OH MSA 19 0.0%
Sioux Falls, SD MSA 19 0.0%
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ MSA 19 0.0%
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Foreign-Born Physicians by MSA
MSA DESCRIPTION
# OF    
FOREIGN-
BORN 
PHYSICIANS
% OF TOTAL 
FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
Albany, GA MSA 18 0.0%
Biloxi--Gulfport, MS MSA 18 0.0%
Boise City, ID MSA 18 0.0%
Lawton, OK 18 0.0%
Redding, CA MSA 18 0.0%
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA MSA 18 0.0%
Tuscaloosa, AL MSA 18 0.0%
Victoria, TX MSA 18 0.0%
Waco, TX MSA 18 0.0%
Yuma, AZ MSA 18 0.0%
Cumberland, MD--WV MSA 17 0.0%
Hamilton/Middletown, OH 17 0.0%
Kankakee, IL MSA 17 0.0%
Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME PMSA 17 0.0%
Salem, OR MSA 17 0.0%
Dover, DE MSA 16 0.0%
Eugene--Springfield, OR MSA 16 0.0%
Lafayette--West Lafayette, IN MSA 16 0.0%
Panama City, FL MSA 16 0.0%
Pittsfield, MA MSA 16 0.0%
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA MSA 16 0.0%
Anchorage, AK MSA 15 0.0%
Bismarck, ND MSA 15 0.0%
Bloomington--Normal, IL MSA 15 0.0%
Boulder/Longmont, CO 15 0.0%
Fort Smith, AR--OK MSA 15 0.0%
Racine, WI PMSA 15 0.0%
Sharon, PA 15 0.0%
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA MSA 14 0.0%
Bellingham, WA MSA 14 0.0%
Grand Forks, ND/MN 14 0.0%
Green Bay, WI MSA 14 0.0%
Hickory--Morganton, NC MSA 14 0.0%
Lake Charles, LA MSA 14 0.0%
Steubenville--Weirton, OH--WV MSA 14 0.0%
Yuba City, CA MSA 14 0.0%
Arecibo, PR MSA 13 0.0%
Danville, VA MSA 13 0.0%
Duluth, MN--WI MSA 13 0.0%
Eau Claire, WI MSA 13 0.0%
Elmira, NY 13 0.0%
Jackson, MI 13 0.0%
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# OF    
FOREIGN-
BORN 
PHYSICIANS
% OF TOTAL 
FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
Janesville--Beloit, WI MSA 13 0.0%
Lincoln, NE MSA 13 0.0%
Waterloo--Cedar Falls, IA MSA 13 0.0%
Abilene, TX MSA 12 0.0%
Benton Harbor, MI MSA 12 0.0%
Caguas, PR MSA 12 0.0%
Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA 12 0.0%
Jackson, TN MSA 12 0.0%
Asheville, NC MSA 11 0.0%
Athens, GA MSA 11 0.0%
Bremerton, WA PMSA 11 0.0%
Bryan--College Station, TX MSA 11 0.0%
Gadsden, AL 11 0.0%
Goldsboro, NC MSA 11 0.0%
Hattiesburg, MS 11 0.0%
Kenosha, WI PMSA 11 0.0%
Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA 10 0.0%
Billings, MT MSA 10 0.0%
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 10 0.0%
Florence, SC MSA 10 0.0%
Fort Collins--Loveland, CO MSA 10 0.0%
Glens Falls, NY 10 0.0%
Pueblo, CO MSA 10 0.0%
Santa Fe, NM MSA 10 0.0%
Yakima, WA MSA 10 0.0%
Dothan, AL MSA 9 0.0%
Jacksonville, NC MSA 9 0.0%
Kokomo, IN MSA 9 0.0%
La Crosse, WI/MN 9 0.0%
Lewiston--Auburn, ME MSA 9 0.0%
Manchester, NH MSA 9 0.0%
Muncie, IN MSA 9 0.0%
New London--Norwich, CT--RI MSA 9 0.0%
St. Joseph, MO MSA 9 0.0%
Sherman-Denison, TX MSA 9 0.0%
Sioux City, IA--NE MSA 9 0.0%
Elkhart--Goshen, IN MSA 8 0.0%
Jamestown, NY 8 0.0%
Las Cruces, NM MSA 8 0.0%
Myrtle Beach, SC MSA 8 0.0%
Owensboro, KY MSA 8 0.0%
Rocky Mount, NC MSA 8 0.0%
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BORN 
PHYSICIANS
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FOREIGN-BORN 
PHYSICIANS
Williamsport, PA MSA 8 0.0%
Anniston, AL MSA 7 0.0%
Dubuque, IA 7 0.0%
Florence, AL MSA 7 0.0%
Houma--Thibodaux, LA MSA 7 0.0%
Missoula, MT 7 0.0%
Provo--Orem, UT MSA 7 0.0%
Decatur, IL 6 0.0%
Fayetteville--Springdale, AR MSA 6 0.0%
Greeley, CO MSA 6 0.0%
Longview--Marshall, TX MSA 6 0.0%
Lynchburg, VA MSA 6 0.0%
State College, PA MSA 6 0.0%
Wausau, WI MSA 6 0.0%
Aguadilla, PR MSA 5 0.0%
Bloomington, IN MSA 5 0.0%
Joplin, MO MSA 5 0.0%
Medford, OR MSA 5 0.0%
Rapid City, SD MSA 5 0.0%
St. Cloud, MN MSA 5 0.0%
San Angelo, TX 5 0.0%
Sheboygan, WI MSA 5 0.0%
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR MSA 5 0.0%
Corvallis, OR MSA 4 0.0%
Flagstaff, AZ/UT 4 0.0%
Jonesboro, AR 4 0.0%
Cheyenne, WY MSA 3 0.0%
Decatur, AL MSA 3 0.0%
Pine Bluff, AR MSA 3 0.0%
Sumter, SC MSA 3 0.0%
Enid, OK 2 0.0%
Great Falls, MT 2 0.0%
Casper, WY 1 0.0%
Lawrence, KS MSA 1 0.0%
Pocatello, ID MSA 1 0.0%
Rural/No MSA 3325 7.5%
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Table A3
Sex of Physicians by Place of Birth and Year
U.S.-Born Physicians
1997 % 1999 % 2001 % 2003 % 2005 % 2007 %
F        4,712 22%        4,823 23%   5,073 24%    5,523 26%    5,751 28%    5,859 29%
M 16,785 78% 16,514 77% 16,088 76%  15,757 74%  14,995 72%   14,473 71%
      21,497 21,337  21,161   21,280   20,746   20,332 
Foreign-Born Physicians
1997 % 1999 % 2001 % 2003 % 2005 % 2007 %
F        1,981 27%        2,220 29%    2,229 29% 2,231 30%     2,230 31%     2,102 30%
M 5,440 73% 5,514 71% 5,429 71% 5,290 70% 4,951 69% 4,886 70%
       7,421        7,734    7,658    7,521    7,181     6,988 
Total (All Physicians)
1997 % 1999 % 2001 % 2003 % 2005 % 2007 %
F        6,693 23%        7,043 24%    7,302 25%    7,754 27%    7,981 29%    8,061 29%
M 22,225 77% 22,028 76% 21,517 75% 21,047 73% 19,946 71% 19,359 71%
      28,918       29,071   28,819   28,801   27,927   27,320 
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Table A4
2SLS Estimates of the Relationship between Immigration and Physician Wages:
First Stage Regression Results
Dependent Variable:                                    I = Immigration Share  FB FE Share             FB USE Share       
Independent Variable        (2)(a)                               (2)(b)                                                        (2)(c)
Male -0.0045 *** -0.0042 *** -0.0039 *** -0.0009 ***
(.0006) (.0005) (.0004) (.0002)
Age -0.0010 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 ***
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0000)
Age2 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
MedB 0.5634 *** 0.8965 *** 0.5921 *** -0.1881 ***
(.0151) (.0101) (.0090) (.0042)
S = Physician Stock 0.0857 *** 0.1214 *** 0.0010
(.0025) (.0020) (.0006)
FB90 1.012 *** 1.0126 *** -0.4970 *** 0.4694 ***
(.0039) (.0033) (.0071) (.0033)
FE_IV 3.3796 *** -0.5766 ***
(.0248) (.0078)
F-Test for Instruments 68,737 *** 96,185 *** 29,492 *** 23,569 ***
# of obs 159,448 128,074 128,074 128,074
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared .2934 .4800 .5755 .5292
Adj. R-Squared .2933 .4799 .5755 .5292
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note: All regressions have fewer observations than Part (1) due to lack of data on the FB90 variable.  
Part (2)(a) has more  observations than (2)(b) and (2)(c)  due to lack of data on the physician stock variable.
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Table A5
2SLS First-Difference Estimates of the Relationship between Immigration and Physician Wages:
First Stage Regression Results
Dependent Variable: ?? ? ??????????n Share                       ??? ?? ????? ??? ??? ?????
Independent Variable      (5)(a)                            (5)(b)                                                 (5)(c)? ???? -0.3114 *** -0.3874 *** -0.3296 *** -0.0880 ***
(.0750) (.0834) (.0684) (.0316)? ??? -0.0438 *** -0.0553 *** -0.0328 ** -0.0176 ***
(.0156) (.0177) (.0145) (.0062)? ???2 0.0007 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0002 ***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0001)? ???? 0.3473 *** 0.2736 * 0.5891 *** -0.4105 ***
(.1321) (.1520) (.1265) (.0584)? ? ????????? ????? 0.0703 0.1247 ** -0.0344
(.1050) (.0609) (.0520)
FB90 0.7365 *** 0.6924 *** -0.2951 *** 0.3472 ***
(.0854) (.0894) (.1069) (.0572)
FE_IV 2.3406 *** -0.4554 ***
(.2860) (.1392)
F-Test for Instruments 74.29 *** 59.99 *** 51.52 *** 25.65 ***
# of obs 482 395 395 395
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-Squared 0.4412 0.4415 0.4796 0.3918
Adj. R-Squared 0.4353 0.4329 0.4702 0.3808
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note: All regressions have fewer observations than Part (4) due to lack of data on the FB90 variable.  
Part (5)(a) has more  observations than (5)(b) and (5)(c)  due to lack of data on the physician stock variable.
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Table A6
2SLS Estimates of the Relationship between Immigration and Physician Wages with Specialty Controls:
First Stage Regression Results
Dependent Variable:                                    I = Immigration Share                      FBFE_Share          FBUSE_Share                    
Independent Variable        (7)(a)                               (7)(b)                                                        (7)(c)
Male -0.0041 *** -0.0039 *** -0.0038 *** -0.0010 ***
(.0006) (.0005) (.0004) (.0002)
Age -0.0011 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 ***
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0000)
Age2 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
MedB 0.5733 *** 0.8949 *** 0.5907 *** -0.1883 ***
(.0150) (.0102) (.0090) (.0042)
S = Physician Stock 0.0849 *** 0.1208 *** 0.0009
(.0025) (.0020) (.0006)
Anesthesiology -0.0031 ** -0.0032 *** -0.0005 -0.0003
(.0012) (.0010) (.0008) (.0004)
Family/General -0.0187 *** -0.0074 *** -0.0056 *** -0.0015 ***
(.0010) (.0007) (.0006) (.0003)
OBGYN -0.0025 ** -0.0019 * -0.0004 -0.0005
(.0013) (.0010) (.0008) (.0003)
Pediatrics -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0006 **
(.0010) (.0008) (.0006) (.0003)
Psychiatry -0.0024 ** -0.0017 * -0.0006 0.0003
(.0011) (.0009) (.0007) (.0003)
Surgery -0.0069 *** -0.0052 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0007 ***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0005) (.0002)
Internal Medicine 0.0060 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0032 *** -0.0000
(.0009) (.0007) (.0005) (.0002)
FB90 1.0076 *** 1.0109 *** -0.4985 *** 0.4691 ***
(.0039) (.0033) (.0071) (.0033)
FE_IV 3.3795 *** -0.5766 ***
(.0247) (.0078)
F-Test for Instruments 68,151 *** 95,898 *** 29,240 *** 23,472 ***
# of obs 159,448 128,074 128,074 128,074
R-Squared 0.2963 0.4807 0.5763 0.5294
Adj. R-Squared 0.2962 0.4807 0.5762 0.5293
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note: All regressions have fewer observations than Part (6) due to lack of data on the FB90 variable.  
Part (7)(a) has more  observations than (7)(b) and (7)(c)  due to lack of data on the physician stock variable.
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Table A7
2SLS First-Difference Estimates of the Relationship between Immigration and Physician Wages with Specialty Controls:
First Stage Regression Results
Dependent Variable:         ?? ? ??????????? ????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ??? ?????
Independent Variable (10)(a)                          (10)(b)                                              (10)(c)
? ???? -0.3791 *** -0.4615 *** -0.3803 *** -0.1093 ***
(.0778) (.0863) (.0714) (.0341)? ??? -0.0475 *** -0.0638 *** -0.0378 *** -0.0196 ***
(.0153) (.0175) (.0145) (.0064)? ???2 0.0007 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0002 ***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0001)? ???? 0.3151 ** 0.3171 ** 0.5863 *** -0.3876 ***
(.1362) (.1572) (.1342) (.0536)? ? ????????? ????? 0.0371 0.0864 -0.0328
(.1218) (.0757) (.0536)? Anesthesiology 0.3782 ** 0.3801 ** 0.1988 0.1401 **
(.1573) (.1784) (.1438) (.0619)? Family/General -0.0327 0.1092 -0.0010 0.0674 *
(.0868) (.0932) (.0737) (.0387)? OBGYN -0.0697 0.0515 0.0786 0.0191
(.1479) (.1651) (.1303) (.0642)? Pediatrics 0.0088 0.1078 0.0529 -0.0022
(.1225) (.1319) (.1080) (.0578)? Psychiatry -0.5499 *** -0.5261 *** -0.4954 *** -0.0333
(.1210) (.1402) (.1148) (.0586)? Surgery -.0460 -0.0071 -0.0276 0.0302
(.1045) (.1155) (.0900) (.0442)? Internal Medicine 0.2783 ** 0.3362 *** 0.2384 ** 0.0936 **
(.1153) (.1245) (.0992) (.0459)
FB90 0.7065 *** 0.6828 *** -0.3124 *** 0.3532 ***
(.0874) (.0907) (.1063) (.0572)
FE_IV 2.3527 *** -0.4734 ***
(.2862) (.1425)
F-Test for Instruments 65.31 *** 56.67 *** 50.58 *** 26.99 ***
# of obs 482 395 395 395
R-Squared 0.4808 0.4804 0.5170 0.4081
Adj. R-Squared 0.4676 0.4627 0.4993 0.3863
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  All coefficients reported with robust standard errors.
Note: All regressions have fewer observations than Part (9) due to lack of data on the FB90 variable.  
Part (10)(a) has more  observations than (10)(b) and (10)(c) due to lack of data on the physician stock variable.
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